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Equal Protection and the Wealth Primary
Jamin Raskin and John Bonifazt
From an exclusionary beginning, American democracy has, to its great
credit, accomplished the progressive expansion of the franchise and the steady
elaboration of the meaning of one person/one vote.' By way of both constitu-
tional and statutory change, the people have extended the ballot to citizens
without taxable property, African-Americans, women, and eighteen-year-olds. 2
Interpreting the commands of the Constitution, the Supreme Court has fortified
the central democratic principle of one person/one vote by striking down
practices that demean and undermine a citizen's voting power: grandfather
clauses,3 exclusionary white primaries,4 state poll taxes,' restrictions on the
t Jamin B. Raskin is an Associate Professor of Law, Washington College of Law at the American
University; A.B. Harvard College 1983; J.D. Harvard Law School 1987. John C. Bonifaz is Staff Attorney
for the Center for Responsive Politics; A.B. Brown University 1987; J.D. Harvard Law School 1992. The
views expressed in this Article are those of the authors. The Center for Responsive Politics is a nonprofit
research group based in Washington, D.C., which studies the influence of private money in elections.
Research for this Article was supported by the Center and by a research grant to Professor Raskin from
the Washington College of Law. Professor Raskin, who was the primary author of the Equal Protection
analysis in this Article, would like to thank his colleagues Burt Wechsler and Mark Hager, and his research
assistants Jenny Anest, Monifa Bailey, Nathan Brill, Jodi Cleesattle, Jason Gardner, Alisa Macht, and Laura
Roecklein. Mr. Bonifaz, who was the primary author of the reappraisal of Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S.
1 (1976), would like to thank the staffof the Center for Responsive Politics, including the following people:
Jackie Duobinis, Maya Gibson, Josh Goldstein, Paul Hoff, John Calvin Hughes, Lindsay Kniffin, Ellen
Miller, Rodney Mickle, and Richard Mullins. Both authors would like to thank the members of the Working
Group on Electoral Democracy, an association of grassroots activists and researchers from around the
country, for their early articulation of the issue of private money in politics as a voting rights issue. The
authors would also like to recognize the contributions of the participants in a July 1993 conference held
to discuss this Article. Our conclusions and our mistakes are, needless to say, still very much our own.
1. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964) (noting that "history has seen a continuing
expansion of the scope of the right of suffrage in this country"); see also Jamin B. Raskin, Legal Aliens,
Local Citizens: The Historical, Constitutional and Theoretical Meanings ofAlien Suffrage, 141 U. PA. L.
REV. 1391, 1392-93 (1993) (noting historical progress of ideal of "universal suffrage"). But see id. at 1393
(arguing that conventional account of steadily expanding franchise ignores progressive loss of voting rights
by legal aliens).
2. The property and wealth qualifications were dismantled by state constitutional and statutory changes.
See generally CHILTON WILLIAMSON, AMERICAN SUFFRAGE FROM PROPERTY TO DEMOCRACY 1760-1860
(1960). African-Americans, women, and eighteen-year-olds were formally enfranchised by the addition
of the Fifteenth, Nineteenth, and Twenty-Sixth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, respectively. The
Fifteenth Amendment states "[t]he right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or
abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude."
U.S. CONST. amend. XV. The Nineteenth Amendment states the right to vote "shall not be denied or
abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex." U.S. CONST. amend. XIX. The Twenty-
Sixth Amendment states "[tihe right of citizens of the United States, who are eighteen years of age or older,
to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of age." U.S.
CONST. amend. XXVI.
3. See Guinn and Beal v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915) (holding that amendment to constitution
of Oklahoma of 1910, known as "Grandfather Clause," which reverted to conditions of suffrage existing
prior to Fifteenth Amendment, was unconstitutional on Fifteenth Amendment grounds).
4. See Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927) (finding that state statute barring African-Americans
from participation in Democratic primary violates Equal Protection Clause of Fourteenth Amendment);
Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932) (concluding that State Democratic Party's action amounted to
delegation of state power and was invalid under Fourteenth Amendment); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S.
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suffrage rights of citizens in the armed services,6 unnecessarily long residency
requirements,7 excessively high candidate filing fees,8 and malapportioned
legislative districts that dilute the potency of the vote.9 But threats to the
integrity of the vote and the electoral process are never fully vanquished; they
take different forms in different times. Today, the principal question of demo-
cratic legitimacy facing our society is whether the extraordinary power of
private wealth to shape the nature and outcome of public elections is consistent
with the constitutional command of one person/one vote.
Private money is a controlling force in American politics and govern-
ment."0 This reality is rooted, at least partially, in the financial structure of
our electoral system; monied interests organized around their relationship to
wealth dominate the fundraising process that, to a large extent, determines
which candidates for public office will win and what they will do once elect-
ed."I When the logic of the market-everything is for sale and the highest
649 (1944) (noting exclusion of African-Americans from party primary by vote of party membership
constituted state action violating the Fifteenth Amendment); Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953) (holding
private scheme, which withdrew significance from Democratic primary by pre-selecting white candidates
through a club endorsement, unconstitutional as violating the Equal Protection Clause). See discussion infra
part IV.
5. See Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666 (1966) (stating "[w]e conclude
that a State violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment whenever it makes the
affluence of the voter or payment of any fee an electoral standard. Voter qualifications have no relation
to wealth nor to paying or not paying this or any other tax.").
6. See Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965) (noting that Equal Protection Clause forbids state from
denying ballot to members of armed services who are stationed and domiciled in that state).
7. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336 (1972) (invalidating one-year residency requirement
as impermissible burden on right to vote: "[A] citizen has a constitutionally protected right to participate
in elections on an equal basis with other citizens in the jurisdiction.").
8. See Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972). See discussion infra part I.
9. See Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1963) (noting lopsided apportionmentof state's congressional
districts violates command of U.S. CONST. art. i, § 2 that representatives be chosen "by the People of the
several States"); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 567 (1964) (requiring state legislative districts be
apportioned on a population basis on the theory that "to the extent that a citizen's right to vote is debased,
he is that much less of a citizen.").
10. Numerous observers have documented this widely shared perception. See, e.g., DAN CLAWSON
ET AL., MONEY TALKS: CORPORATE PACs AND POLITICAL INFLUENCE (1992) ("Money has always been
a critically important factor in campaigns, but the shift to expensive technology has made it the dominant
factor. Today money is the key to victory and substitutes for everything else .... To be a viable political
candidate, one must possess-or be able to raise-huge sums .... The quest for money is never ending.");
ELIZABETH DREW, POLITICS AND MONEY: THE NEW ROAD TO CORRUPTION (1983) (describing crucial
effects of money on political process); AMITAI ETzIONI, CAPITAL CORRUPTION: THE NEW ATTACK ON
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (1984); THOMAS FERGUSON & JOEL ROGERS, RIGHT TURN: THE DECLINE OF
THE DEMOCRATS AND THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN POLITICS (1986) (demonstrating powerful effect wealthy
interests and PACs had on conservative turn taken by Democratic Party in the 1980s); Stephen Loffredo,
Poverty, Democracy and Constitutional Law, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1277, 1278-79 (1993) (noting "the
central role that wealth plays in American politics" and pointing out that "the inordinate role that wealth
plays in American politics" has been characterized "as the most pressing threat to American democracy
today").
11. See discussion infra parts II, 1II; KEVIN PHILLIPS, THE POLITICS OF RICH AND POOR (1990)
(tracing dominance of wealthy interests in political process and crucial role of politics in organizing unequal
distribution of wealth); Charles R. Beitz, Political Finances in the United States: A Survey of Research,
95 ETHICS 129, 143-46 (1984) (discussing dangers posed by wealth and inequality to political system);
Robert Sherrill, The Looting Decade: S&L, Big Banks and Other Triumphs of Capitalism, 1990 THE
Equal Protection and the Wealth Primary
bidder wins-overrides the political principle of one person/one vote, inegalita-
rian economic relationships undermine, and often override, democratic political
relationships. 2 In politics, candidates backed with wealth get a longer and
far more respectful hearing than those who are not; in government, public
policy rapidly comes to reflect and reinforce wealth inequalities. In the last
decade, for example, American citizens who, as a structural matter, have had
little to do with financing political campaigns have experienced a steady
erosion of their living standards, while the wealthiest Americans have been flourishing 3
NATION 589 (describing friendly takeover of American political process by "uncontrolled money").
12. See Loffredo, supra note 10, at 1285 (stating that it is hardly "news" that "disparities of wealth
lead to domination and disempowerment in the political sphere"). But this is not to suggest that the structure
of our campaign finance system is the sole or even the dominant force in reproducing political, social and
economic inequality. As Jeffrey M. Blum has noted, "political dominance by economic elites is endemic
to American society, if not to every form of industrialized society." Jeffrey M. Blum, The Divisible First
Amendment: A Critical Functionalist Approach to Freedom of Speech and Electoral Campaign Spending,
58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1273, 1374 (1983). Blum argues that the system of using private wealth to pay for
the costs of public election campaigns-what he calls the "'electoral-instrumental' mode of domination"-
simply exaggerates and consolidates the inequalities produced by the two "more pervasive and ultimately
more important" modes of domination, which he calls "structural-economic" and "ideological-hegemonic."
Id. at 1375-76. These more deeply rooted structures of domination are arguably more recalcitrant than the
election system and will escape challenge so long as economic elites continue to dominate the political
system. For, as Blum notes, "the dependence of officials on support by dominant private interests results
in a dangerous reduction of the state's autonomy." Id. at 1377.
13. Money Income and Poverty Status in the United States, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, Sept. 1990;
PHILLIPS, THE POLITICS OF RICH AND POOR, supra note 11; JOHN E. SCHWARZ & THOMAS J. VOLGY,
THE FORGOTTEN AMERICANS 61-63 (1992); Loffredo, supra note 10, at 1314-30. Stephen Loffredo's article
states:
Over the last decade, the number of individuals with incomes below the federal poverty threshold
increased both in absolute numbers and as a percentage of the total population. In 1990 alone,
2.1 million individuals joined the ranks of the poor, increasing the total percentage of persons
below the poverty line to 13.5%. More than one fifth of the nation's children, 21.8%, live in
poverty. These children suffer severe material deprivation: they frequently are of low birthweight
and are later hungry; they are ill-housed, if at all; they lack health care; and they receive inferior
public schooling. Every fifty-three minutes poverty kills an American child. The United States
loses more children to poverty every five years than it lost soldiers to battle during the entire
Vietnam War.
Id. at 1316-18 (citing Jason DeParle, Number of People in Poverty Shows Rise in U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
27, 1991, at A1, B5); Jason DeParle, Report, Delayed Months, Says Lowest Income Group Grew, N.Y.
TIMES, May 12, 1992, at A 15. See Joseph J. Romm & Amory B. Lovins, Fueling a Competitive Economy,
FOREIGN AFF., Winter 1992/93, at 46, 55 (noting breakdown of U.S. economic security). The Romm and
Lovins article goes on to state:
America's economic security has slowly eroded. Median family income is now lower than in
1973. Only the richest fifth of Americans experienced significant growth in income or wealth
since the late 1970s; the remainder suffered stagnating or declining living standards. Wages have
dropped to 1960s levels for most workers, and half the full-time jobs created in the 1980s paid
wages below the poverty level for a family of four. The United States is the only major industrial-
ized nation whose manufacturing workers earn less per hour than a decade ago.
Id. See also Denise Hamilton, The Recession Blues: From Bradbury to El Monte, Belt-Tightening Has
Become a Way of Life, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 15, 1992, at JI. Similarly, Hamilton states:
Nationwide, the inflation-adjusted incomes of the top 1% of Americans grew 75.5% between
1980 and 1990, while the poorest 20% suffered a 3.7% decline. Many experts say the statistics
illustrate the failure of spending for federal poverty programs to keep up with inflation. At the
same time, tax breaks for the wealthy, surging defense spending for a few corporations in the
1980s and regulatory relief that benefitted businesses and their affluent investors may all have
played a role in the growing disparity.
Id. See Peter G. Gosselin, Across US, Families Face More or Less, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 19, 1992, at 1
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In our contemporary money politics, well-heeled interests use large cam-
paign contributions to buy political influence with state and federal legislators,
governors, and presidents who work legislative and policy results favorable
to these interests.' 4 The cycle continues when interests satisfied by the legisla-
tive returns on their financial investments quickly replenish the campaign
treasuries of cooperative officials, who then coast safely to reelection.15 As
if the ferocious logic of this market in legislation did not furnish enough
insurance for politicians seeking reelection, incumbents confer on themselves
handsome campaign-style subsidies that deter opposition and guarantee the
uninterrupted flow of shrewdly invested private wealth. 6 The political system
today runs, in the vivid words of the only Independent member of the U.S.
House of Representatives, on the "greed and self-interest of a ruling elite that
is causing massive suffering for tens of millions of working people." 7
This system, in many ways stacked and closed, is essentially corrupt, but
not just in the rather banal sense that elected officials and their contributors
(noting disparity increase between wealth status of wealthy and poor during early 1990s). Accordingly,
the statistics show that the:
Congressional Budget Office figures for the top 1 percent of income earners-about 600,000
families in 1990-show that the average family incomes of the rich nearly doubled in little more
than the last decade alone, reaching an average of $515,600. But while the economy was lifting
the top, it was driving down the bottom. While the rich doubled their holdings, poor families
watched their already low incomes slide 5 percent to a 1990 average of $9,800. As a result, the
gap between rich and poor has opened to its widest in decades.
Id. See also Stephanie Coontz, On the Edge, CHI. TRW., Oct. 11, 1992, (Magazine), at 13 (noting that
"Ibly 1990, the total income of the richest I percent of Americans, after taxes, was just about the same
as the total income shared by the poorest 40 percent; the income of the richest 5 percent of American
families today is roughly the same as that of the entire bottom 60 percent."). Coontz goes on to stress the
similar disparity of wealth in the area of stocks: "iw]ealth is even more unequally distributed: The top 1
percent of families owns 42 percent of the net wealth of U.S. families, including 60 percent of all corporate
stock and 80 percent of all family-owned trusts." Id.
14. Our focus here on the influence of money in legislative and executive branch politics is not meant
to prejudge the question of how campaign money affects the administration of justice in states that elect
judges. We do not yet have sufficient empirical information on this subject.
15. Economic interests seeking governmental favors, both structural and ad hoc, deploy their money
according to two strategies: "electoral" and "legislative." Daniel Hays Lowenstein, On Campaign Finance
Reform: The Root of All Evil Is Deeply Rooted, 18 HOFSTRA L. REV. 301, 308 (1989) (citing KAY L.
SCHOLZMAN & JOHN T. TIERNEY, ORGANIZED INTERESTS AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 206-07 (1986)).
Under the electoral strategy, interests "make contributions to enhance the chances of victory of candidates
who are likely, if they are elected, to pursue the policies the contributors favor." Id. Under a legislative
strategy, they "make contributions to whomever they think is likely to be elected, in the hopes of influenc-
ing the likely winner to pursue the favored policies by reason of gratitude, a desire to encourage future
donations from the same or additional groups, or similar motivations." Id. Lowenstein points out that
"[aiccording to most scholars who have considered the question, economic interest contributors tend to
follow a legislative strategy." Id. at 309.
16. See discussion infra parts 11, 111.
17. Bernard Sanders, Clinton Must Go to the People, 1993 THE NATION 865, 865 (arguing that
President Clinton should undertake populist strategy of rallying American people "against the greed and
self-interest of a ruling elite that is causing massive suffering for tens of millions of working people").
Congressman Sanders's impassioned rhetoric reflects the fact that he travels regularly between impoverished
and forgotten parts of America and the remote corridors of wealth and power. His election to the House
of Representatives from Vermont in 1990 as an Independent and a radical populist demonstrates that the
system is not perfectly closed by money, but his sober observations from the inside merit special attention.
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make specific quid pro quo arrangements. s More deeply, the tyranny of
private money corrupts the democratic relationship of one person/one vote by
making it exceedingly difficult for poor or middle-class persons to run for
office, by leaving them without meaningful electoral choices, and by assuring
that wealthy interests will set the parameters of political debate and the nature
of the legislative agenda.9 Not surprisingly, the nonaffluent majority contin-
ues to lose ground in public policy and turn away in disgust from the political
system.2 It is important to see, therefore, that the existing regime not only
18. To be sure, these arrangements often form the unchallenged background workings of our political
system. Sometimes the media and public will focus on a specific egregious scandal, such as the recent
Keating Five case, in which five U.S. senators sought favorable treatment from federal banking regulators
for their campaign donor, Charles Keating, the owner of the failed Lincoln Savings & Loan. But the real
scandal lies in the systemic, intricately woven financial relationship between special interests seeking
governmental favor and elected officials seeking campaign contributions. Many years of analysis of
campaign contributions by the Center for Responsive Politics show a remarkable and direct correlation
between the committee seats held by members of Congress and their sources and patterns of campaign
contributions. Members of the Banking Committees of the House or Senate, for example, typically receive
substantial contributions from individuals and political action committees in the commercial banking and
savings and loans industries, as well as from securities firms or insurance companies. See LARRY MAKIN-
SON, OPEN SECRETS: THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CONGRESSIONAL MONEY & POLITICS 102-03, 136-37 (2d
ed. 1992). Republican Senator Phil Gramm of Texas, who sits on the Senate Banking, Housing & Urban
Affairs Committee, received $1.2 million in such motivated contributions in the 1990 election cycle. Id.
at 102. Democratic Senator John Kerry of Massachusetts, who also sits on that committee, received more
than $750,000 in committee-relatedcontributions. Id. These special interest, committee-relatedcontributions
usually come from all over the country and are sometimes so substantial that they make up a majority of
a member's large contributions ($200 or more). Consider, for example, Democratic Representative John
Dingell of the 16th District of Michigan, who is the Chair of the House Energy and Commerce Committee,
and Republican Representative Norman Lent of the 4th District of New York, who is the Committee's
Ranking Republican member. In 1990, Dingell received more than $460,000 in special interest contributions
related to that committee, constituting 61% of Dingell's large contributions. Id. at 144. Similarly, Lent
received some $310,000 from industries with interests in that committee, making up 68% of all of Lent's
large contributions. Id. These examples are illustrative, not aberrational.
19. Understanding the distinction between these two forms of corruption is essential in order to
confront these problems in their full depth. The Supreme Court finally suggested its understanding of the
distinction in Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990) (upholding constitu-
tionality of Michigan criminal statute preventing corporations from spending general funds as independent
expenditures in state elections). In Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), and the cases that followed, the
Court set forth one definition of "corruption" in the political process representing it as the "'financial quid
pro quo' corruption" of elected officials. Austin, 494 U.S. at 659 (quoting FEC v. National Conservative
Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 497 (1985)). But in Austin the Court also recognized Michigan's
compelling interest in combatting a "different type of corruption in the political arena: the corrosive and
distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with the help of the corporate
form and that have little or no correlation to the public's support for the corporation's political ideas."
Austin, 494 U.S. at 660.
20. See Gar Alperovitz, Memorandum to President-Elect Clinton, TIKKUN, Nov.-Dec. 1992, at 13
(stating "[miost Americans know that at bottom there is something fundamentally wrong about power in
our democracy-something intimately connected with money, wealth, and the dominant influence of large
corporate assemblies of influence which prevents us from building the kind of society we want."). On the
degradation of the living standards of ordinary people, see supra note 13. A term like "non-affluent
majority" is obviously indistinct and elastic, but the inability to draw bright lines when discussing wealth
does not render the concept of wealth discrimination meaningless or unrecognizable. In Bullock v. Carter,
405 U.S. 134 (1972), the Supreme Court, by striking down excessively high candidate filing fees,
acknowledged that the resulting "disparity in voting power based on wealth cannot be described by
reference to discrete and precisely defined segments of the community as is typical of inequities challenged
under the Equal Protection Clause.. .. " Id. at 144. As a general matter, however, the Court stated, "we
would ignore reality were we not to recognize that this system falls with unequal weight on voters, as well
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invites the kickback, the sweetheart relationship, and the de facto bribe, but
also undermines the very essence of democracy by substantially "withdraw[ing]
significance from" the formal electoral process.21
It has been assumed since the Supreme Court's decision in Buckley v.
Valeo22 that little can be done, legislatively or judicially, to alter this essen-
tially plutocratic and inegalitarian structure. When we define money as speech,
it is easy to conclude that there is no way to restrain its antidemocratic charac-
ter in the political process. But whether or not Buckley was rightly decided on
the speech question 23-and the academic debate never ceases to rage-the
First Amendment paradigm does not begin to pose, much less resolve, urgent
questions about our campaign finance system that concern the rights of all
citizens, not just the wealthy, to "influence the political process effectively. "24
Does the current method of financing election campaigns leave the political
process equally open to all potential candidates and all voters? Does it foster
meaningful political debate in which all social groups have an equal chance
to participate? Or have big money and incumbent self-subsidies become so
dominant that they now substantially crowd out meaningful political participa-
tion by all but the wealthiest Americans? Equal protection, whether rooted in
the Fourteenth Amendment or the roughly parallel requirements of the Fifth
Amendment, 2 provides the principal constitutional26 paradigm for analyzing
as candidates, according to their economic status." Id. The Court simply referred to the class in question
as "the less affluent segment of the community" and as "voters of modest means." Id.
21. This crucial and evocative phrase comes from Justice Felix Frankfurter. Terry v. Adams, 345
U.S. 461, 474 (1953) (Frankfurter, I., concurring) (invalidating on equal protection grounds an all-white
private club's candidate endorsement process). Frankfurter found that the organization's candidate
nominating process, in which elected officials participated, amounted to "a wholly successful effort to
withdraw significance from the State-prescribed primary .... " Id. (emphasis added).
22. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
23. For views compatible with the arguments presented in this Article, see LAURENCE H. TRIBE,
CONSTrTUTIONAL CHOICES 193-94 (1985); Blum, supra note 12; Marlene A. Nicholson, Buckley v. Valeo:
The Constitutionality of the Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, 1977 Wis. L. REV. 323;
Mark Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1363 (1984); J. Skelly Wright, Politics and the
Constitution: Is Money Speech?, 85 YALE L.J. 1001 (1976). For views consistent with the Court's approach
in Buckley, see Lillian R. BeVier, Money and Politics: A Perspective on the First Amendment and
Campaign Finance Reform, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1045 (1985); Richard A. Epstein, Modem Republicanism-Or
the Flight From Substance, 97 YALE L.J. 1633, 1643-45 (1988).
24. Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 133 (1986) (finding claims of unlawful political gerrymandering
to be justiciable on equal protection grounds).
25. The Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause generally embodies the same constitutional prohibition
against equal protection violations as the Fourteenth Amendment. See Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497
(1954) (striking down congressionally created school segregation in District of Columbia). Also implicated
in our discussion of private money in federal elections is the Article 1, Section 2 command that representa-
tives be chosen "by the People of the several States" and the Seventeenth Amendment's requirement that
senators be "elected by the people" of the states. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2. In Wesberry v. Sanders, 376
U.S. 1 (1964), the Court found that the command embodied in Article I that representation be chosen "by
the People" required House district apportionment on the principle of one person/one vote. Although this
case did not compel the Court's holding the following year in Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964),
that equal protection required one person/one vote as the standard for state legislative apportionment, the
Reynolds Court noted that "Wesberry clearly established that the fundamental principle of representative
government in this country is one of equal representation for equal numbers of people, without regard to
Equal Protection and the Wealth Primary
these questions about the political process.27 This is because equal protection
is violated "when the electoral system is arranged in a manner that will
consistently degrade a voter's or a group of voters' influence on the political
process as a whole. "21
The purpose of this Article is to demonstrate that the current campaign
finance regime is inconsistent with equal protection or, at the very least,
warrants congressional action to vindicate equal protection. The argument is
three-tiered. First, we argue in Part I that, although economic status is not a
suspect classification, the placement of economic obstacles in a political
candidate's path to election is subject to close equal protection scrutiny when
voters are thereby deprived of a meaningful choice between candidates.
Second, in Parts II and III, we contend that the current regime-the
combination of the "wealth primary" 29 and incumbent self-subsidies-sets up
an economic gauntlet that, in "every practical sense,"30 prevents less affluent
candidates-"potential office seekers lacking both personal wealth and affluent
race, sex, economic status, or place of residence within a State." Id. at 560-61. For the purposes of this
Article, we assume that the effect of these various commands is roughly the same.
26. The authors also believe that there are serious questions as to whether the current campaign finance
regime is consistent with the statutory requirements of § 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1973 (1988) (providing that no voting "standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by
any State or political subdivision in a manner which results in a denial or abridgement" of the right to vote
on account of race). Violation of § 2 may be established by showing, on the totality of the circumstances,
that "the political processes leading to the nomination or election in the State or political subdivision are
not equally open to participation" by minorities "in that its members have less opportunity than other
members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice.
The extent to which members of a protected class have been elected to office in the State or political
subdivision is one circumstance which may be considered." 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (1988).
Preliminary research we are now pursuing indicates that, when compared both across districts and
within districts, minority candidates, particularly challengers, are likely to raise much less money than white
candidates and have less electoral success because of it. The destructive effects of this pattern are mitigated
to a certain extent by the existence of majority-African-American and Latino districts which essentially
create a separate playing field for minority candidates. However, when we look at the success of racial
minorities in statewide races or races in the majority-white districts, it seems likely that private financing
of political campaigns now systematically favors white candidates and white interests over minorities. The
question of a Voting Rights Act violation, however, is beyond the scope of this Article.
27. It is by now a truism, but no less important for being so, that the right of equal protection has
extraordinary importance in the political process, since voting is "a fundamental political right ...
preservative of all rights." Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886). The equal protection
repercussions of private money in public election campaigns were explored by Professor Marlene Arnold
Nicholson in a remarkably prescient article published nearly twenty years ago. See Marlene A. Nicholson,
Campaign Financing and Equal Protection, 26 STAN. L. REV. 815 (1974). Nicholson argued that the
political system's dependence on "large private contributions" causes two principal "anti-democratic
effects": "'multiple voting' and 'multiple representation.'" Id. at 819 (drawing on the work of DAVID
ADAMANY, FINANCING POLrrIcs 236 (1969)). Multiple voting gives wealthy voters the chance to multiply
the weight of their votes while multiple representation permits wealthy donors to increase their access and
influence to officeholders. Id. at 819-21. Our analysis is consistent with these insights but posits that the
phenomena of multiple voting and multiple representation have grown so huge and systemic that a relatively
formalized system of exclusion has resulted, which we call "the wealth primary." Our analysis focuses
further on the role of elected officials themselves in shaping and protecting this system.
28. Davis, 478 U.S. at 132.
29. See generally Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 143 (1972). See discussion infra part III.
30. Bullock, 405 U.S. at 143.
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backers"-from competing for office. 3' This system sharply reduces voter
choice and "falls with unequal weight on voters, as well as candidates, accord-
ing to their economic status ... ."32 This effect denies huge numbers of
people meaningful electoral choice and unlawfully degrades their influence on
the political process as a whole. To substantiate these assertions, we rely on
dense empirical descriptions of the contemporary operation of the wealth
primary and incumbent self-subsidies in federal elections. We have chosen to
focus on federal elections both to demonstrate that we are facing a pervasive
national problem and also because empirical data is so difficult to come by in
the vast majority of states.
Third, in Part IV we argue that both state action and legislative intent are
involved in structuring this system. Commonly perceived as an unregulated
and laissez-faire free market, our federal campaign finance regime is, in fact,
infused with state action by virtue of: (a) the public self-subsidy granted to
incumbents in Congress; (b) the systemic enactment of legislation which
rewards and benefits cash contributors for their campaign support; (c) the real-
world operation of the wealth primary as a significant and effective part of the
political process; and (d) the deep and pivotal involvement of state officials
with the wealth primary, incumbent self-subsidies, and contributor-favoring
legislation. The intent arguably required for showing an equal protection
violation in the electoral process is similarly evidenced by the political self-
subsidies granted to members of Congress and the pervasive enactment of
legislation which rewards specific groups of cash contributors for their cam-
paign support.
Following our argument about the unlawfulness of the campaign finance
regime, in Part V we explore the difficult question of judicial remedies. We
argue that, at a minimum, a system providing a floor of adequate public
financing for all serious but indigent candidates must be created to satisfy
constitutional requirements. A more expansive remedy would require the
government to provide funding to indigent candidates equal to that of privately
financed candidates, in escalator fashion. The most radical remedy would
categorically invalidate private financing of candidate campaigns as inconsistent
with the command of one person/one vote and then compel adoption of a
public financing system.
Finally, in Part VI we explore ways in which to retire or supersede Buckley
v. Valeo,33 the case which has largely shaped our current system and which
now must be revisited in the context of the equal protection paradigm. We
emphasize, however, that the equal protection flaws in the wealth primary can
be remedied in several ways which are completely consistent with Buckley.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 144.
33. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
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In other words, although we believe that Buckley was wrongly decided and
should be overhauled, we do not have to wait for this doctrinal revision before
necessary democratic changes are brought about in the campaign finance
structure.
I. WEALTH AS AN UNLAWFUL BARRIER TO PARTICIPATION BY
CANDIDATES AND VOTERS IN THE POLITICAL PROCESS
The modern Supreme Court has long been hostile to the placement of
financial obstacles in the paths of citizens trying to participate in public
elections. In 1966, two years after the Twenty-Fourth Amendment banned poll
taxes in federal elections, the Supreme Court in Harper v. State Board of
Elections3" struck down a poll tax of $1.50 in Virginia state elections. Justice
Douglas, speaking for the Court, found that "a State violates the Equal Protec-
tion Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment whenever it makes the affluence of
the voter or payment of any fee an electoral standard. Voter qualifications have
no relation to wealth . . . . " Likening wealth to race, he declared that
wealth was a factor "not germane to one's ability to participate intelligently
in the electoral process."36
Justice Douglas recognized that, by striking down the time-honored institu-
tion of poll taxes, the Court was overturning a practice that had never before
been thought to be inconsistent with the Equal Protection Clause. Indeed, this
fact figures significantly in the vehement dissenting opinions lodged by Justices
Black and Harlan, who accused the majority of forsaking the original meaning
of the text in order to embark on the improper project of modernizing the
Constitution.37 But Justice Douglas maintained that "the Equal Protection
Clause is not shackled to the political theory of a particular era."38 He in-
voked as authority for this proposition the Court's decision in Brown v. Board
of Education,39 which repudiated the longstanding doctrine of separate-but-
34. 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
35. Id. at 666.
36. Id. at 668. To bolster his opinion, Justice Douglas invoked the uplifting democratic language of
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (striking down malapportioned state legislature and establishing
the principle of one person/one vote in state legislative elections). See Harper, 383 U.S. at 667. The Court
in Reynolds repeatedly opposed the confusion of economic relationships with the democratic principle of
one person/one vote. See Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 562 (noting "[ljegislators are elected by voters, not farms
or cities or economic interests. ").
37. See id. at 671, 677 (referring to Court's prior upholding of Georgia's poll tax system and charging
that Court consulted "its own notions rather than following the original meaning of the Constitution")
(Black, J., dissenting); id. at 684 (stating that poll taxes "have been a traditional part of our political
structure") (Harlan, J., dissenting).
38. Id. at 669.
39. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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equal in matters of race.' Surely, Justice Douglas implied, the justices op-
posed to a progressive interpretation of the meaning of equal protection did
not want to turn the clock back to Plessy. In a cogent and arresting formula-
tion, he stated: "Notions of what constitutes equal treatment for the purposes
of the Equal Protection Clause do change."41
Of course, notions of equal protection change in different ways. The
passage into history of the Warren Court brought a general halt to the expand-
ing vision of the requirements of equal protection regarding the rights of the
poor. In San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,42 the Burger
Court effectively announced its general retreat from strict scrutiny of cases
involving wealth classifications.43 In Rodriguez, a group of Mexican-Ameri-
can parents challenged as violative of equal protection the Texas method of
partially financing public schools through local property taxes. The plaintiffs
argued that the system discriminated against school children who lived in
school districts with a low property-tax base. But the Court found that, as a
matter of equal protection doctrine, the plaintiffs did not meet the necessary
standard for suspect wealth classes set in prior cases: that "because of their
impecunity they were completely unable to pay for some desired benefit, and
as a consequence, they sustained an absolute deprivation of a meaningful
opportunity to enjoy that benefit."" The Court reasoned that students in
poorer districts still received educations, albeit less pricy ones, and that it was
not even clear that the more expensive educations were better." Furthermore,
the Court refused to classify education as a fundamental right.'
It is widely but mistakenly believed that Rodriguez foreclosed all claims
of unlawful wealth discrimination. But the Justices made clear that discrimina-
tion based on economic status must pass close equal protection scrutiny when
it does involve recognized fundamental rights such as access to court tran-
scripts and, crucially for our purposes, access to the ballot.47 The Court
specifically reaffirmed earlier holdings in which it had found wealth discrimi-
nation to be unconstitutional, including its important decision the year before
in Bullock v. Carter, the case which provides the basic theoretical structure
40. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
41. Harper, 383 U.S. at 669.
42. 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (finding that Texas school-financing system based on property taxes did not
violate equal protection because education was not fundamental right and no suspect class had been
identified in case).
43. The case followed a series of decisions in which the Court elaborated a standard of minimum
rationality review for judging claims that social legislation discriminates against the poor. See, e.g.,
Dandrige v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (using minimum rationality standard in reviewing equal
protection claim regarding welfare benefits); James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971) (minimum rationality
standard for inadequate housing claims).
44. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 20.
45. Id. at 43.
46. Id. at 37.
47. Id. at 22.
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for our argument.48
In Bullock, the Supreme Court struck down on equal protection grounds
a series of filing fees that the state of Texas required primary candidates to
pay to their political parties. 49 One plaintiff, a would-be Democratic candidate
for El Paso County Commissioner, was required to pay $1,424.60." Another
plaintiff sought to run for County Judge in Tarrant County but did not have
the required $6300 assessment. A third plaintiff wanted to run for Commis-
sioner of the General Land Office but lacked $1000 for the filing fee.5 Filing
fees for state legislative candidates ranged from $150 to $1000.52
In searching for the proper test to examine the plaintiffs' challenge to the
filing fees, Chief Justice Burger, writing for the Court, noted that the system
did not "place a condition on the exercise of the right to vote" nor "quantita-
tively dilute votes that have been cast.""' Rather, the Texas system created
"barriers to candidate access to the primary ballot, thereby tending to limit the
field of candidates from which voters might choose."5 4 But the existence of
these barriers "does not of itself compel close scrutiny."" When approaching
candidate restrictions, the Court found that "it is essential to examine in a
realistic light the extent and nature of their impact on voters.""
In his common-sense and worldly analysis of the filing fees, Justice Burger
regarded their impact from the standpoint of political candidates and voters of
modest means. Unlike a nominal filing fee requirement "that most candidates
could be expected to fulfill from their own resources or at least through modest
contributions, the very size of the fees imposed under the Texas system" gave
48. 405 U.S. 134 (1972). The Court in Rodriguez cited Bullock as one of its precedents in which "[tihe
individuals, or groups of individuals, who constituted the class discriminated against . . . shared two
distinguishing characteristics: because of their impecunity they were completely unable to pay for some
desired benefit, and as a consequence, they sustained an absolute deprivation of a meaningful opportunity
to enjoy that benefit." 411 U.S. at 20. In Bullock, the Rodriguez Court said, "Ibloth of the relevant
classifying facts found in the previous cases were present there. The size of the fee, often running into the
thousands of dollars and, in at least one case, as high as $8900, effectively barred all potential candidates
who were unable to pay the required fee. As the system provided 'no reasonable alternative means of access
to the ballot,' inability to pay occasioned an absolute denial of a position on the primary ballot." Id. at 22
(citing Bullock, 405 U.S. at 149). It is debatable whether the Rodriguez Court's pinched formulation
correctly describes the class of plaintiffs that succeeded in Bullock v. Caner. After all, it was not found
that it was impossible for all of the plaintiff candidates in Bullock to pay the appointed fees, nor was it the
case that poorer voters were actually prevented from voting. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, § 16-52, at 1654-55 (2d ed. 1988).
49. Fees for most district, county and precinct offices had to be paid to county party executive
committees, which fixed the fee amounts. Bullock, 405 U.S. at 137-38. Texas law required the county party
committee to apportion the cost of its primary among the various candidates "as in their judgment is just
and equitable." The committee's judgment would be guided by "the importance, emolument, and term of
office for which the nomination is to be made." Id. (citation omitted).
50. Id. at 135-36.
51. Id. at 136.
52. Id. at 139.
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it "a patently exclusionary character. " 7 This "exclusionary character" con-
fronts the candidates first, for many "potential office seekers lacking both
personal wealth and affluent backers are in every practical sense precluded
from seeking the nomination of their chosen party, no matter how qualified
they might be, and no matter how enthusiastic their popular support."58
The "exclusionary mechanism" quickly produces an effect on voters that
is "neither incidental nor remote. "" With so many less-affluent candidates
knocked out of the running, voters are "substantially limited in their choice
of candidates."' Moreover, Justice Burger found, the reduction of electoral
choice caused by the financial status of the candidate fell "more heavily on the
less affluent segment of the community, whose favorites" were likely to be
"unable to pay the large costs required by the Texas system."6" Meanwhile,
the system that stiff-arms the poor automatically "gives the affluent the power
to place on the ballot their own names or the names of persons they favor."62
Significantly, Justice Burger acknowledged that the resulting "disparity in
voting power based on wealth cannot be described by reference to discrete and
precisely defined segments of the community as is typical of inequities chal-
lenged under the Equal Protection Clause ... "63 He also conceded that
"there are doubtless some instances of candidates representing the views of
voters of modest means who are able to pay the required fee. "64 But as a
general matter, he stated, "we would ignore reality were we not to recognize
that this system falls with unequal weight on voters, as well as candidates,
according to their economic status."65
"Because the Texas filing fee system [had] a real and appreciable impact"
on voting and "this impact [was] related to the resources of the voters support-
ing a particular candidate," the Court decided that the fees would be "closely
scrutinized" to see whether they were "reasonably necessary to the accomplish-
ment of legitimate state objectives "66 Texas identified two interests
supporting its plan.
The State first asserted that the filing fees were needed to regulate the
number of candidates on the ballot and guarantee the seriousness of those who
made it on to the ballot. Justice Burger acknowledged "the legitimate objec-
57. Id.
58. Id.
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tives of the State in avoiding overcrowded ballots,"67 but emphasized that a
state cannot pursue its objectives "by totally arbitrary means; the criterion for
differing treatment must bear some relevance to the object of the legisla-
tion."6 The filing fees failed this test because they did not work to exclude
frivolous candidates, but all candidates who could not afford to pay. Thus,
poor but serious candidates were excluded while frivolous but wealthy candi-
dates were not. The plaintiffs in the case, Justice Burger emphasized, were
"unable, not simply unwilling, to pay the assessed fees."69 The Court here
established the pivotal principle that a state may not lawfully define a
candidate's political seriousness according to the wealth she has at her disposal.
Second, Texas claimed that the filing fees saved the State "the cost of
conducting the primary elections."70 This is a "legitimate state objective,"
Justice Burger found, but under the appropriate close-scrutiny standard, "there
must be a showing of necessity."71 Of course, requiring individual candidates
to shoulder the costs of the primary was not necessary since the state-that is,
the taxpayers and voters themselves-could carry the costs. The Court did not
flinch when the State argued that, if the fees were struck down, "the voters,
as taxpayers, will ultimately be burdened with the expense of the prima-
ries. "72 The primary, Justice Burger emphasized, is part of the democratic
process and "[i]t seems appropriate that a primary system designed to give the
voters some influence at the nominating stage should spread the cost among
all of the voters in an attempt to distribute the influence without regard to
wealth. "" Given the many functions government pays for, "it is difficult to
single out any of a higher order than the conduct of elections at all levels to
bring forth those persons desired by their fellow citizens to govern.""
The Court neatly rejected the argument that "since the candidates are
availing themselves of the primary machinery, it is appropriate that they pay
that share of the cost that they have occasioned. ""7 The costs of the campaign
do not arise "because candidates decide to enter a primary or because the
parties decide to conduct one," Justice Burger stated, "but because the State
has, as a matter of legislative choice, directed that party primaries be held. The
State has presumably chosen this course more to benefit the voters than the
67. Id. at 145. The Court invoked various plausible state objectives under this heading, such as
preventing voter confusion and assuring that "the winner is the choice of a majority, or at least a strong
plurality, of those voting, without the expense and burden of runoff elections." Id. The Court also found
that "the state has an interest, if not duty, to protect the integrity of its political processes from frivolous
or fraudulent candidacies." Id. (citing Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431, 442 (1971)).
68. Id.
69. Id. at 146.
70. Id. at 147.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 148.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 148-49.
75. Id. at 147-48.
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candidates." 76 The Court concluded:
By requiring candidates to shoulder the costs of conducting primary elections through
filing fees and by providing no reasonable alternative means of access to the ballot, the
State of Texas has erected a system that utilizes the criterion of ability to pay as a
condition to being on the ballot, thus excluding some candidates otherwise qualified and




Two years after Bullock v. Carter and one year after Rodriguez, the
Supreme Court held in Lubin v. Panish78 that California could not deprive
an indigent citizen the right to run for office, here the position of County
Supervisor, because of his inability to pay a $701.60 filing fee. Although the
Court found that the fees would be permissible if the state provided other
reasonable means for indigent candidates to get on the ballot, such as collecting
petition signatures, it underscored its prior conclusion that filing fees do not
"test the genuineness of a candidacy or the extent of the voter support of an
aspirant for public office. "71 In fact, "prohibitive filing fees" can "effectively
exclude serious candidates."80 The Court concluded by stressing that "our
tradition has been one of hospitality toward all candidates without regard to
their economic status." 81
Beyond the poll tax and filing fee cases, one Supreme Court case of recent
vintage has taken up the theme of the rights of groups in the political process
not to have their political power systematically traduced by electoral arrange-
ments, and thus is of special note: Davis v. Bandemer. 2 This case involved
an equal protection challenge by Democrats in Indiana to the Republicans'
partisan gerrymander of the state's legislative districts. Although the Bandemer
Court declined to strike down the Indiana plan, it found claims of unlawful
political gerrymandering to be justiciable based on the theory that "each
political group in a State should have the same chance to elect representatives
of its choice as any other political group."3 The Court held that an equal
protection violation may be found "where the electoral system substantially
disadvantages certain voters in their opportunity to influence the political
76. Id. at 148.
77. Id. at 149.
78. 415 U.S. 709 (1974).
79. Id. at 717. Of course, the Court's specific holding here is dubious: that equal protection is satisfied
by a regime in which wealthy candidates can pay their way to the ballot while poorer candidates must get
on the ballot by collecting signatures. If money is not a proxy for seriousness, as the Court insists, such
a regime imposes a seriousness requirement on poor candidates, who must collect signatures, but gives
more affluent candidates a free ride to a ballot position, defeating the Court's own rationale.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 717-18.
82. 478 U.S. 109 (1986).
83. Id. at 124.
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process effectively."84 Such a finding must be supported by evidence of
"continued frustration of the will of a majority of the voters or effective denial
to a minority of voters of a fair chance to influence the political process."85
Taken together, these cases stand for the principle that neither wealth nor
poverty may be used to block meaningful participation by a group of citizens
in the electoral process. When the costs of running for office interfere with
political candidacy and meaningful participation on the basis of wealth, equal
protection requires close judicial scrutiny of the arrangement. The Supreme
Court has recognized nonaffluent citizens as a group with common interests
in the political process, and equal protection forbids arranging the electoral
system "in a manner that will consistently degrade . . . a group of voters'
influence on the political process as a whole."86
II. THE WEALTH PRIMARY AND INCUMBENT SELF-SUBSIDIES AS
"EXCLUSIONARY MECHANISMS" IN THE ELECTORAL PROCESS
In order to understand the process that we call the "wealth primary," it is
necessary to view the election of members of Congress not as a set of com-
pletely random and discrete events but as a system of relationships structured
by law and state action. Viewed in this way, the seeming chaos of the political
process gives way to remarkably consistent patterns of wealth-based discrimi-
nation and vote dilution, as well as money-based political self-entrenchment.
Indeed, the Texas state election system struck down by the Court in Bullock
v. Carter was arguably more open to participation by nonaffluent candidates
and their supporters than is the current federal election process. This section
explores the following features that define the operation of the federal political
campaign process: exorbitant costs that effectively freeze out poorer candi-
dates, stack the deck in favor of candidates backed by wealth and incumbency,
and reduce electoral choice; an almost invisible network of public and private
campaign subsidies to incumbents; the critical role of private money in produc-
ing (and predicting) electoral victory; and a process increasingly dominated
by wealth in ways that systematically discourage full political dialogue, partici-
pation, and competition.
A. The Costs of Running, the Price of Admission
The costs of running for federal office have soared to the point that most
people of average means cannot even contemplate candidacy, and those who
84. Id. at 133.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 132.
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do run are forced to rely on large donations from individual and political action
committee (PAC) contributors aligned with vested economic interests. In 1992,
a seat in the U.S. Senate cost, on average, $3.9 million to win,87 and a seat
in the U.S. House of Representatives cost, on average, $543,000 to win."8
Of course, these figures are artificially small since they include so many cheap
races in which well-financed incumbents have been able to save their funds
and spend less, because they have long since vanquished any prospect of
serious competition. In 1992, for example, four out of every five House
incumbents faced either no challenger at all or a challenger with so little
money as not to be deemed a real threat.8 9
When we turn to the most expensive races in the country, where real
competition exists, we can glimpse how outrageous the system has grown. On
the Senate side, the most expensive race occurred in New York, where Repub-
lican Senator Alfonse D'Amato spent $11.5 million to defeat his Democratic
opponent, Robert Abrams, who spent $6.4 million.9" The most expensive
House race in 1992 took place in the 22nd district of California, where Repub-
lican candidate Michael Huffington spent an impressive $5.4 million to defeat
his Democratic opponent Gloria Ochoa, who spent the relatively modest sum
of $666,625.91
These huge sums of money directly affect the kinds of citizens who can
afford to wage serious campaigns for public office. If they are not lawyers,
businesspeople, or the independently wealthy-persons who often have the
flexibility to run in their existing positions-candidates must often quit their
jobs a year or more before the election in order to start raising money full-
time. Also, they often must have sufficient resources both to support them-
selves and their families during the campaign and to donate or lend their
campaigns start-up money. These sobering realities make it all but impossible
for people of ordinary means to run for high office.
Of course, poorer candidates can campaign on a shoestring-keep their
jobs, spend less time fundraising, and not try to run as the wealthy do-but
this is a recipe for not being taken seriously and almost certain defeat. Big
money is simply indispensable to purchasing the television and radio commer-
cials, the campaign literature and brochures, and the political consultants and
staff needed to wage a serious campaign. The candidate who raises and spends
the most money wins in better than four out of five races. In 1992, eighty-nine
percent of the winners in races for the House of Representatives, and eighty-
six percent of the winners in races for the U.S. Senate, outspent their oppo-
87. Center for Responsive Politics, Analysis of Federal Election Commission Records (unpublished
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nents.92 Even when we control for the incumbency factor, it becomes clear
that wealth is, most of the time, a decisive factor in election. In 1992 open seat
House races-those without incumbents-the candidate spending more money
won three out of four times. 93 The centrality of money both to waging a
serious campaign and to winning election is why we describe the chase for
funds as a "wealth primary," a central, relatively formal, and usually determi-
native part of the electoral process. As several long-time observers of the
process have concluded: "the champion money raiser wins almost regardless
of the merits." 94
Although no comprehensive study has been done on the subject, we need
look no further than the membership of the U.S. Senate to discern how the
costs of running systematically favor the wealthy and freeze out ordinary
people. At least fifty-one out of one hundred senators are millionaires, com-
pared to less than one-half of one percent of the general population.95 This
means that millionaires are overrepresented at least one hundred times in the
U.S. Senate. If people living under the poverty level-13.5% of the popula-
tion-were overrepresented in equal fashion, the entire U.S. Senate would be
made up of poor people. As it stands, there is not a single U.S. Senator who
was legally defined as poor prior to election. Indeed, there is not a single
Senator who was making anything close to the median personal income in
1990, which was $16,257.96 United States Senators are drawn from an eco-
nomic class far removed from the situation of the vast majority of American
citizens.
B. Incumbent Subsidies, Public and Private
When we combine the effects of the exorbitant costs of campaigning with
the effects of the financial advantages conferred on incumbents, the system
appears increasingly impenetrable. The incumbency financial advantage has
two aspects: the public self-subsidies organized by Congress and the private
money that comes from economic interests seeking legislative influence with
elected officials.
Consider first the public self-subsidies. To begin with, there is the salary
92. Id.
93. In open-seat races in 1992, the context in which poorer candidates have their best shot at election,
the winner of the wealth primary won 71 races compared to 20 races for lesser-funded candidates. Id.
94. CLAWSON, supra note 10, at 8 (emphasizing, however, the word "almost" since there are excep-
tions, such as Paul Wellstone's upset victory over U.S. Senate incumbent Rudy Boschwitz in 1990).
95. Ten Fun Facts About Congress, ROLL CALL, Apr. 23, 1992, at 3 (stating that "at least" 51
senators are millionaires); More of Everything; New York Compared With the Nation. WASH. POST, July
12, 1992, at All (stating that .4% of the general population consists of millionaires).
96. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE U.S.: 1992, 439 (112 ed. 1992).
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of the office holder-$133,60097 for members of the House and Senate-that
is set by Congress itself.9" This is a hidden but crucial benefit since members
of the House and Senate are supported by the public while they are permitted
to campaign for reelection, which gives them a decisive advantage over most
working people who have to quit their jobs to run. Official salaries are also
large enough to permit them to make personal loans to their campaigns that
can be paid back by private contributions.
Beyond their salaries, incumbents have awesome public resources at their
command. Consider the House of Representatives, whose members spent $700
million in 1991 on office, staff, and other expenses. 99 That year, every mem-
ber of the House received $515,760 for personal staff expenses, an average
of $176,000 for district office expenses, and an average mail allowance of
$200,000.° But these payments are the tip of the iceberg in some cases,
since members who head committees and subcommittees have "millions more
at their disposal each year. " '°  This money buys sophisticated computer
technology with detailed demographic targeting capability, massive constituen-
cy services both in Washington, D.C. and in the districts, large staffs and
interns, telephones, WATS lines, and money for travel.
The conceptual problem in trying to quantify the official campaign self-
subsidy is where to draw the line between legitimate official expenses that
happen to have a positive political spillover effect and official expenses that
are primarily and deliberately designed for the political benefit of incum-
bents.102 Clearly a good deal of spending by members of Congress goes to
legitimate official duties that have only an incidental-albeit major-political
benefit, such as having legislative and administrative assistants and constituen-
cy service workers who help constituents negotiate federal bureaucracies. We
do not propose to count expenses like these as part of the incumbent political
self-subsidy. Also, while different members of Congress can be more or less
scrupulous about using their money and their staffs for electoral purposes, we
charitably assume that all relevant rules are being followed.
But there is at least one category of congressional spending which, by
pervasive social consensus, now qualifies as a clear political self-subsidy in
almost every case: the unsolicited mass franked mailing of newsletters to
district constituents. This widespread practice abuses the congressional franking
97. Salaries of members of Congress are on file with the Office of the Clerk of the U.S. House of
Representatives.
98. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1.




102. It is also clear that distinct political benefits accrue from the intangible attributes of incumbency,
such as the ability to gather media coverage, built-in name recognition, and the like. We do not propose
to count the value of any of these benefits in calculating the incumbent self-subsidy.
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privilege, which permits members to send direct mail to constituents using their
signatures in place of stamps. Between January 1991 and September 22, 1992,
three-fourths of the House, or 310 members, "spent more on franking in this
election cycle than the $108,506 spent by the average challenger on his entire
campaign in 1990."103 House members spent almost $75 million on postage
in this time period and sent out more than 500 million pieces of franked mass
mail, comprised primarily of newsletters to voters. °4 On average, each rep-
resentative spent $171,809 on total postage and sent out more than 1.1 million
mass-mailed pieces of literature.105 Fifty-eight representatives sent out more
than two million pieces of mass mail, and 246 sent out more than a mil-
lion."° Although the franking privilege undoubtedly has legitimate uses,"07
these mass-mailed newsletters generally boast of the member's legislative and
constituent service accomplishments, and can fairly be described as taxpayer-
sponsored campaign literature.
In addition, we ought to count some substantial portion of the expenses paid
for speechwriters, press secretaries and local district offices as political self-
subsidies given the huge, and fairly direct, political function that these expendi-
tures play. Taking all of these kinds of spending together, in an admittedly
inexact and unscientific way, we therefore propose to estimate the political
self-subsidy of congressional incumbents to be the extremely conservative (if
not absurdly low) figure of $200,000 during a two-year period. This figure
represents a small fraction of the public money that House and Senate members
actually spend in a year. But it is important to begin to quantify the public
political self-subsidy since, from the standpoint of the nonaffluent challenger,
the incumbent's public financial advantages reinforce the incumbent's private
financial advantages, forming a wall of money around her campaign.
The incumbent's private money-raising advantage stems from two factors.
First, since the incumbent is an office holder, donors seeking a particular
legislative result will already contribute to her campaign; this is clear from the
correlation of special interest contributions with senators and representatives
sitting on certain committees. Second, since the incumbent has a built-in
financial advantage from the system's political self-subsidy, in addition to
whatever intangible political benefits are provided by incumbency, she is the
odds-on favorite to win in the next election. Thus, donors seeking to secure
103. Group Obtains Post Office Congressional Franking Files, Each Member's Mailings Listed for
First Time, NAT'L TAXPAYERS UNION FOUND. NEWS (Nat'l Taxpayers Union Found., Washington, D.C.),
Oct. 21, 1992, at 1.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 2.
107. Common Cause v. Bolger, 574 F. Supp. 672, 677 (D.D.C. 1982) ("[T]here is little doubt that
the franking privilege is a valuable tool in facilitating the performance by individual Members of Congress
of their constitutional duty to communicate with and inform their constituents on public matters.").
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political influence in the future will direct money to the incumbent as the likely
winner of the next election.
These money dynamics create an extraordinary proincumbent tilt in the
process. On average, incumbents in the House of Representatives gain more
than a three-to-one private money advantage over challengers. In 1992, the
average House incumbent did outspend her challenger by such a ratio, or by
the remarkable amount of $403,000.'0' The average incumbent received a
total of $535,131 in private contributions, had $692,030 to spend, and spent
$557,294 in the race. The average challenger raised $155,908 and spent
$154 ,50 9 ."°9 Furthermore, incumbents in 1992 raised more than eight times
the amount of money challengers did from PACs. The 349 House incumbents
running in the 1992 general election raised more than $89 million from PACs,
while the 314 challengers received less than $11 million from PACs.11
The wall of money enclosing incumbents has fatal consequences for
political competition. With their public funds and private warchests, incum-
bents scare off serious opposition and dry up most potential sources of cam-
paign money for potential rivals. If we use the helpful analysis provided by
Common Cause, we can see that four out of five House incumbents face either
no challenger at all or a challenger with so little money as not to be deemed
in any way a plausible electoral threat. Common Cause defines "financially
unopposed" races as ones in which an incumbent faces a challenger who raises
less than $25,000; "financially noncompetitive" races as those in which
challengers raise more than $25,000 but less than fifty percent of the funds
raised by the incumbent; and "financially competitive" races as ones in which
the challenger has raised at least half the money the incumbent has. 1 ' Apply-
ing this definition to the 1992 elections, we find that of the 339 House incum-
bents running in the general election,1"2 279-or eighty-two percent-of them
were unopposed, financially unopposed, or in financially noncompetitive races.
All of the 279 incumbents with such lopsided fundraising advantages won. 13
Only sixty incumbents were in "financially competitive races," even under
Common Cause's extremely generous definition.114
It comes as no surprise, then, to find that nearly nine out of ten incumbents
seeking reelection win their races. In 1992, the alleged year of the outsider,
108. Center for Responsive Politics, Analysis of Federal Election Commission Records (unpublished
analysis, on file with the Center for Responsive Politics).
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Common Cause, Press Release, Analysis of November 3 Congressional Races 1 (Nov. 6, 1992)
(on file with Common Cause, Washington, D.C.).
112. This does not include the five House races in which, due to redistricting, a House incumbent
ran against another House incumbent.
113. Center for Responsive Politics, Analysis of Federal Election Commission Records (unpublished
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when anti-incumbent feeling was at an extraordinary high in the country, 325
of 363 incumbents seeking reelection to the House of Representatives won their
races, for an astonishing reelection rate of 89.5%."' In the U.S. Senate,
twenty-four of twenty-eight incumbents seeking reelection were returned to
office, for a reelection rate of 85.7%. 6
C. The Wealth Primary Process
Whether they are incumbents or challengers, heirs to family fortunes or
successful lawyers, almost all candidates fish in the same waters when it comes
to fundraising. Candidates for both the House and the Senate overwhelmingly
rely on large contributions from individuals and political action committees to
finance their campaigns. Thus, even if the incumbent self-subsidy advantage
can be overcome, and even if a poorer person can see her way to run for
office, the wealth primary systematically skews the political process by elevat-
ing the concerns of wealthy citizens and interests, whether or not they are
residents of the state or House district, over the concerns of nonaffluent
citizens who do live in the state or House district.
In 1992, no less than seventy-seven percent of total campaign funds in
federal races were raised in contributions of $200 or more, but less than one
percent of the citizenry participated at this extraordinary level of giving. 7
This means that fewer than one in a hundred citizens now provide nearly eight
out of ten dollars in federal election campaigns. There is evidence to support
the intuition that this tiny influential minority is drawn from the wealthiest
Americans, who have politically disposable income. Among individuals, the
average reported contribution is greater than $500: in 1990, the average
reported contribution by an individual was $523.08, and in 1992, it was
115. Id. This includes House incumbents who lost in the primaries. It also includes five House races
in which, due to redistricting, a House incumbent ran against another House incumbent.
116. Id.
117. Center for Responsive Politics, National Library on Money & Politics (unpublished analysis,
on file with the Center for Responsive Politics). This 77% figure includes all large individual contributions
($200 or more), all PAC contributions, all candidate contributions (from a candidate's personal wealth),
and all candidate loans. The large individual contributions category "is explicitly and by definition
composed of donations over $200. The other categories are assumed to be almost totally composed of
amounts over $200. This is a justifiable assumption for the present purposes. For example, less than one
percent of the $200 million in PAC money donated to candidates in the 1992 election cycle came in
contributions of less than $200." Center for Responsive Politics Memorandum from Richard Mullins to
John Bonifaz (Aug. 12, 1993) (on file with authors). The one-percent figure is calculated on a conservative
basis, including those people who make contributions to PACs in amounts of less than $200. The Center
for Responsive Politics defines the money which makes up the 77% figure as "big money." Though it may
include some PAC money which is gathered in small contributions-in particular, union PAC money-the
bulk of the "big money" category comes from business interests. The Center has documented that, of all
contributions to congressional campaigns, business interests outgive labor interests by a ratio of 4.5:1.
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$536.76.11 In a recent telephone survey of 15,000 Americans, the Citizen
Participation Project found that citizens making more than $125,000 a year,
who constitute only 2.7% of the population, are better than ten times more
likely to give a campaign contribution than people making under $15,000 a
year, who constitute 17.7% of the population."1 9 Thus, the wealth primary
is disproportionately dominated by a small and wealthy fraction of the public.
The majority of citizens do not give campaign contributions and have
nothing to do with the wealth primary. Candidates spend very little time
seeking small contributions from people earning average incomes. "Contribu-
tions from 'ordinary' people are simply too small to fund a campaign. In fact,
small contributions cost more money to solicit than they produce in campaign
funds."120 Although federal reporting law does not permit us to know how
many people are in this category, we do know that financial contributions to
federal candidates from citizens offering less than $200 account for less than
one quarter-twenty-three percent-of total campaign receipts. Thus, while the
"small donor" continues to act as the ideological linchpin of the wealth primary
system, she plays a distinctly minor role in the system's practical workings.
Furthermore, there is no reason to think that contributions under $200 come
from donors economically, socially, or politically representative of America
generally.
We can perceive how the small donor's contribution is so much window-
dressing by looking at the relatively formalized ways in which money is
actually raised by winning federal candidates. As we have seen, the vast
majority of money comes in the form of large contributions from wealthy
individual contributors and PACs. PAC contributions figure increasingly in
the political and social insularity and inaccessibility of the wealth primary. In
1974, there were 608 PACs registered with the Federal Election Commission;
today there are 4195, and PAC contributions have gone up in every elec-
tion.12' In 1992, PACs gave nearly $189 million in federal elections, 22 a
118. Center for Responsive Politics, National Library on Money & Politics (unpublished analysis,
on file with the Center for Responsive Politics). Federal law requires candidate committees to report all
contributions of $200 or more. Those contributions received in amounts of less than $200 are unitemized
and reported in one sum total with each filing with the Federal Election Commission.
119. CITIZEN PARTICIPATION PROJECT, 1992, A STUDY OF THE VOLUNTARY ACTIVITY OF THE
AMERICAN PUBLIC IN POLITICS, VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATIONS, CHARITIES AND RELIGION: SUMMARY OF
FINDINGS 5-6; see also Lynne Duke, Political Participation Is Increasingly Linked to Personal Wealth,
Survey Finds, WASH. POST, Oct. 8, 1992, at A25 (describing the study's conclusion that "[als money
continues to play a central role in political campaigns-to pay staff, buy television time and obtain
computerized mailing lists-these disparities in the political participation of the rich and poor suggest that
those who already have economic clout are involved in politics in ways that disproportionately increase
their influence, making the practice of democracy increasingly biased against the economically disadvan-
taged .... ").
120. Stephen E. Gottlieb, The Dilemma of Election Campaign Finance Reform, 18 HOFSTRA L. REV.
213, 220 (1989).
121. CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS, THE PRICE OF ADMISSION: CAMPAIGN SPENDING IN THE
1992 ELECTIONS 14 (1993) [hereinafter PRICE OF ADMISSIONI.
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sum of money which, if General Electric is in any way representative, is
largely designed to "advance the economic interests" of the special interests
organizing the PACs "in matters pertaining to federal legislation.""
PAC donations constitute a substantial part of the funds raised in federal
campaigns. The average winner of a House race in 1992 collected $222,752,
or forty-two percent of her total campaign revenues, from PACs. 124 Mean-
while, the average loser spent a grand total of $201,263, which means that the
average House winner collects and spends more money from PACs alone than
the average loser collects and spends in toto. 5 On the Senate side, the aver-
age winner collects a remarkable $1,047,042 from PACs out of an average
total of $3,930,638.126
Moreover, PACs play a critical role in shaping another feature of the
current wealth primary system: its non-stop quality for incumbents. While
challenger fundraising is generally limited to the year of the campaign, fundrai-
sing by incumbents goes on during the whole term of office. Indeed, PACs
give a majority of their contributions to House candidates in the first eighteen
months of the campaign cycle. 127 In the 1992 election cycle, sixty-eight per-
cent of all PAC contributions, or $135 million, came in the first eighteen
months. 128 Furthermore, about half of all PAC money comes from Washing-
ton, D.C. alone; in 1990, Washington-based PACs gave more than $77 million
to candidates; the next closest city was New York, where PACs gave $11.2
million. 129 Thus, by staying in Washington and raising early money from
special interest PACs, congressional incumbents can usually deter potential
opponents and outspend and defeat those daring enough to challenge them.
PACs located in Washington or New York occupy a far more significant role
in the wealth primary than do poor or moderate-income voters in the official's
home state or district.
Similarly, large contributions by wealthy interests from out-of-state are
122. Id.
123. See LARRY MAKINSON, ANALYSIS OF GENERAL ELECTRIC PAC CONTRIUTIoNs 1975-1992 1
(1993) (analyzing patterns in G.E. PAC's campaign contributions from FEC records and internal memoran-
da produced by G.E. in litigation, and concluding that there is "overwhelming evidence that the PAC's
unambiguous purpose is to advance the economic interests of General Electric in matters pertaining to
federal legislation"). This analysis notes two specific trends supporting this conclusion: "the overwhelming
proportion of dollars delivered to congressional incumbents" and "the strong tendency to give funds to those
members who sit on committees of particular importance to General Electric . . . ." Id. In 1992, the vast
majority of PAC dollars, almost $127 million, came from corporate PACs, while $43 million was given
by labor PACs. PRICE OF ADMISSION, supra note 121. Ideological and single-issue PACs gave only $18.6
million.
124. PRICE OF ADMISSION, supra note 121, at 14.
125. Id. at 8.
126. Id.
127. Center for Responsive Politics, Analysis of Federal Election Commission Records (unpublished
analysis, on file with the Center for Responsive Politics).
128. Center for Responsive Politics, National Library on Money & Politics (unpublished analysis,
on file with the Center for Responsive Politics).
129. MAKINSON, supra note 18, at 23.
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certainly more important than contributions from poor and median-income
voters who live in the state or district. In 1992, twenty-eight percent of all
individual contributions above $200 collected by candidates for federal office
came from presumably wealthy donors who live outside of the candidates'
states. 30 Of the Democratic and Republican leaders of the sixteen committees
in the U.S. Senate, eleven chairpersons and eight ranking Republicans received
a majority of their campaign money from outside of their states between 1985
and 1990. 131
Specific figures illuminate the character of the wealth primary, in which
the most powerful members of the Senate raise the vast majority of their
money from PACs and persons who do not have a right to vote for them. On
the Democratic side, Senator Patrick Leahy of Vermont, Chair of the Senate
Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry Committee, received ninety-one percent
of his money from outside Vermont between 1985 and 1990.132 Senator
Joseph Biden of Delaware, Chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee, collected
more than $1.2 million from outside his state during that same time period,
accounting for ninety-three percent of his campaign money.133 On the Repub-
lican side, Senator Bob Packwood, the Ranking Republican on the Senate
Finance Committee, received more than $2.1 million, or ninety-two percent
of his campaign money, between 1985 and 1990 from outside his home state
of Oregon.' 34 During that same period, Senator Orrin Hatch, the Ranking
Republican on the Senate Labor and Human Resources Committee, raised more
than $1 million, or ninety-two percent of his campaign money, from outside
Utah. 135
Because of the systemic year-round advantages in fundraising available to
incumbents, their campaign warchests grow over time. Incumbents on average
have considerably more money left over from the last election than their
challengers will raise in toto for the current election. On December 31, 1990,
after the 1990 election, the average House winner had $156,899 left in the
bank. In 1992, the average House challenger raised a total of $155,908.136
130. Center for Responsive Politics, National Library on Money & Politics (unpublished analysis,
on file with the Center for Responsive Politics).
131. See generally MAKINSON, supra note 18. By definition, these figures on Senate Committee
Chairmen and Ranking Republicans are calculated based on committee assignments in 1990. They do not
include former Senator James A. McClure of Idaho, the Ranking Republican on the Senate Energy and
Natural Resources Committee, who did not run for reelection in 1990 and whose campaign finance profile
is unavailable. They do include former Senator Lloyd Bentsen of Texas, who chaired the Senate Finance
Committee and who is now Secretary of the Treasury, and the late Senator Quentin Burdick of North
Dakota, who chaired the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee and who died in 1992.
132. MAKINSON, supra note 18, at 294.
133. Id. at 184.
134. Id. at 324.
135. Id. at 262.
136. Center for Responsive Politics, Analysis of Federal Election Commission Records (unpublished
analysis, on file with the Center for Responsive Politics).
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This means that two years before the 1992 election, without doing any more
fundraising, the average incumbent already had more than the total amount of
money her challenger would be able to raise overall. In 1992, House challeng-
ers spent $53 million in total, but House winners, who were overwhelmingly
incumbents, entered (or re-entered) office with nearly two-thirds that much
money left in the bank. House winners finished with more than $32 million
in hand compared to House losers who finished with $1.3 million in hand.1 37
This 25-to- 1 imbalance sets up the incumbents' financial arsenal to scare away
and defeat opponents in the 1994 election.
The incumbents' effectiveness in raising money continuously throughout
their terms is due, at least partially, to the common practice of monied interests
contributing to a winner after the election is over. Professor Larry Sabato
writes that, after the 1986 elections in which seven incumbent senators were
defeated by Democrats, "there were 150 instances in which a PAC gave to a
GOP candidate before the election and then made a contribution to the victori-
ous Democrats after the votes were counted. "138
By the time election day rolls around and ordinary voters are invited into
the process, the incumbent-or, in an open race, the fundraising champion who
stands in the place of the incumbent-generally possesses, and has exploited,
a huge financial advantage over her opponent. In 1992, the difference in funds
available to winners and losers was, on average, enormous and, in most cases,
dwarfed the percentage difference in vote tallies.1 39 The average winner in
the House spent $543,000, compared to $201,000 for losers. On the Senate
side, winners spent an average of $3.9 million, compared to $2 million for
losers. " Thus, the wealth primary comes to a brief pause, never an end,
as the decisive political power of private money-and public money, carefully
recycled-is proven once again.
III. THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE WEALTH PRIMARY AND
THE INCUMBENT SELF-SUBSIDY
By extrapolating from the political rights announced in Bullock v. Carter
and Davis v. Bandemer, we can identify unlawful practices that are immanent
in the wealth primary. From the logic of Bullock, we can form two relevant
principles: wealth may not be used to deprive a citizen of her right to compete
meaningfully for public office, and the electoral system may not be arranged
137. Id.
138. Larry J. Sabato, Real and Imagined Corruption in Canpaign Financing in Elections, ELECTIONS
AMERICAN STYLE 155 (A. James Reichley ed., 1987).
139. Center for Responsive Politics, Analysis of Federal Election Commission Records (unpublished
analysis, on file with the Center for Responsive Politics).
140. Id.
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in such a way that defines either the political seriousness of the candidate or
her prospects for victory with respect to the wealth that she or her supporters
have. From Davis v. Bandemer, we can form the principle that unconstitutional
discrimination occurs "when the electoral system is arranged in a manner that
will consistently degrade" the influence of nonaffluent citizens "on the political
process as a whole."14 The wealth primary impermissibly uses access to
wealth as both an obstacle to meaningful political candidacy for nonaffluent
citizens and as a proxy for political seriousness. In so doing, it systematically
degrades the influence of poor and working people in the political process.
A. The Wealth Primary
The real-world operation of the wealth primary makes it clear that wealth
has become a primary obstacle to meaningful political candidacy for nonweal-
thy citizens. The plaintiffs in Bullock v. Carter and Lubin v. Panish were asked
to pay sums ranging from only $150 to $8900. These fees are paltry next to
the money it takes to become a serious candidate for federal office today. The
highest of the Texas fees is less than five percent of the $215,000 sum that it
cost a challenger to defeat a House incumbent in the cheapest upset race of
1992 and about one percent of what it cost to win a Senate seat in the cheapest
race for the upper body that year.'42 When we turn from the $215,000 seri-
ousness threshold in House races to the $543,000 amount it takes on average
to win a seat, the overwhelming deterrence built into the system becomes obvi-
ous. To the citizen who is not independently wealthy, the $3.9 million average
price tag on a U.S. Senate seat is nothing short of comical.
It is possible, of course, that comparing filing fees and campaign costs is
mixing apples and oranges because candidates must pay their own filing fees
but may collect contributions from others for the costs of their campaigns. But
in striking down the Texas plan in Bullock, the Court clearly noted that the
unlawful filing fees could be paid either by personal money or by contributions
from supporters. 43 In other words, the Court treated a filing fee as just one
kind of campaign expense. Thus, if it was unlawful to require a Democratic
141. Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 132 (1986).
142. In the 4th Congressional District of South Carolina, Republican challenger Robert Inglis spent
$215,364 to defeat Democratic incumbent Liz Patterson, who spent $335,653. In New Hampshire,
Republican Senate candidate Judd Gregg spent $875,675 to defeat his Democratic opponent John Rauh,
who spent $833,967. Center for Responsive Politics, Analysis of Federal Election Commission Records
(unpublished analysis, on file with the Center for Responsive Politics).
143. Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 143 (1972) ("Unlike a filing-fee requirement that most
candidates could be expected to fulfill from their own resources or at least through modest contributions,
the very size of the fees imposed under the Texas system gives it a patently exclusionary character. Many
potential office seekers lacking both personal wealth and affluent backers are in every practical sense
precluded from seeking the nomination of their chosen party, no matter how qualified they might be, and
no matter how broad or enthusiastic their popular support.") (emphasis added).
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candidate for Judge in Tarrant County, Texas in 1970 to raise $6300 in order
to be a serious candidate, surely it is unlawful (even with inflation) to require
a candidate for the U.S. House of Representatives in the Sixth District of
Texas, where Tarrant County is located, to raise several hundred thousand
dollars to be a serious candidate in 1992.
It is also tempting to distinguish the two cases by pointing out that the filing
fees invalidated by the Court in Bullock kept candidates off of the ballot
entirely while the wealth primary permits equal ballot access. But that formal-
istic distinction ignores Bullock itself since all of the plaintiff candidates in that
case had a perfect right to have their names placed on the general election
ballot for no fee at all.'" The white-primary line of authority also held that
Texas was unconstitutionally excluding African-Americans from state party
primaries despite the fact that African-Americans in each of these cases had
a perfectly secure right to have their names placed on the general election
ballot.'45 They were simply being kept off of a party primary ballot. Bullock,
therefore, must stand for something more than just being able to have one's
name placed on the final ballot. In fact, the Court stated that the party primary
filing fee failed to pass muster for two reasons. First, the primary was possibly
more "crucial" than the general election itself."4 Second, candidates could
not be forced to "abandon their party affiliation in order to avoid the burdens
of the filing fees . . . ."1
These factors also indicate the basic unacceptability of the wealth primary.
The fundraising process is possibly more "crucial" than the ballot on election
day since it weeds out so many candidates, heavily slants the race towards
others, and often makes the general election ballot a mere formality. The fact
that the vast majority of-"winners" in the wealth primary go on to win the
general election reflects the importance of this aspect of the process. Similarly,
candidates should not be forced to abandon their political seriousness in order
to avoid the burdens of the wealth primary. They should not have to surrender
their hopes for victory, their political message, or their chance to communicate
with fellow citizens simply because they do not have, and cannot find, the
money to negotiate the harsh rules of the wealth primary. Candidates must be
given the right to participate seriously in the electoral process on an economi-
cally nonexclusive basis. ' This perspective is consistent with the Bandemer
144. Id. at 146.
145. See Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 664 ("When primaries become a part of the machinery
for choosing officials, state and national, as they have here, the same tests to determine the character of
discrimination or abridgement should be applied to the primary as applied to the general election.").
146. Bullock, 405 U.S. at 146-47.
147. Id.
148. Candidates could bypass the wealth primary today, but since "financially superior" candidates
win in the vast majority of races and the vast majority of money spent on campaigns is raised in the wealth
primary, it would be political suicide to do so. Because the wealth primary is possibly more "crucial" than
either the party primary or the general election, candidates cannot constitutionally be closed out of it on
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Court's identification of a right to "influence the political process" effectively
that goes far beyond the simple right to have one's name appear on the bal-
lot. 149
The principal constitutional defect of the wealth primary is that it equates
the money that a candidate has, or is able to raise, with her political serious-
ness. But the equation of wealth with political seriousness was condemned in
Bullock precisely because it presumes the seriousness of the rich and the
frivolousness of the poor. It is far more likely that the ability to raise money
reflects either accidents of birth or the candidate's ideological compatibility
with the elite economic interests that dominate the wealth primary.
When we examine the wealth primary's effects on voters, we find the
secondary "exclusionary" impact noticed in Bullock. The effective exclusion
of candidates lacking personal or political access to wealth leaves poorer
citizens without a natural rallying point in the electoral process. True, less
affluent voters can sometimes find affluent candidates with whom they agree,
a fact also noted by the Court in Bullock,50 but surely the distorting mecha-
nism of the wealth primary systematically undermines the development of
political leadership, organization, and consciousness in poorer communities.
Beyond the wealth primary's tendency to screen out candidates not backed
by wealth, less affluent voters are also not given the opportunity to affect
equally the political positions and programs of those candidates who are
running. Citizens who do not have any money to give are totally excluded from
participation in the wealth primary. In white-primary terms, they are totally
excluded from "an integral part" of the electoral process."' Those who can
give ten dollars, but for whom $200 is unthinkable, are at an awesome, if
relative, disadvantage; we have seen that the great bulk of all campaign mon-
ey-seventy-seven percent-is raised in contributions of $200 or more. These
voters are denied meaningful participation in the wealth primary. In reality,
we know that the wealth primary operates by completely bypassing tens of
millions of less affluent citizens and focusing on groups of individuals and
PACs who are organized with the purpose of influencing, and making large
contributions to, candidates for federal office. In practice, this means that the
less affluent parts of the public not only fail to sustain their own candidates
but also are frozen out of the big-money process which largely determines the
viability, longevity, and success of those candidates running.
When citizens of modest means go to the polls, they are voting for candi-
dates whose political seriousness has been determined by a money-gathering
a wealth-discriminatory basis.
149. Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 132 (1986).
150. Bullock, 405 U.S. at 144 (stating that "there are doubtless some instances of candidates
representing the views of voters of modest means who are able to pay the required fee.").
151. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 469 (1953).
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process which, by definition, systematically demotes their interests. It is no
wonder, therefore, that voting rates decline with wealth, and hugely dispropor-
tionate numbers of the poor regard electoral results as afait accompli and vote
with their bottoms by never leaving home. 52 Indeed, "apathy" looks like
a much more rational choice when participation means getting to cast a ballot
for one of two candidates preselected by wealthy interests, many of which do
not even inhabit the district or state in which the election is taking place.
Nonaffluent citizens may not now be as categorically excluded from a critical
part of the electoral process as African-Americans were when the all-white
Jaybird Club convened in Texas,153 but surely they are part of an electoral
system "arranged in a manner that will consistently degrade" their influence
"on the political process as a whole."154
The systemic degradation of the political influence of the nonaffluent is best
witnessed by government policy. Congress is far more responsive to the
political interests of the wealthy than the poor, and often acts to the detriment
of those who do not participate in the wealth primary. As political campaign
costs and expenditures have soared in the last two decades, poor and working-
class people have steadily lost economic ground, while wealthy individuals and
corporations have been greatly enriched.155
Twenty years ago the United States led the world in the standard of living
enjoyed by working people, but today the United States ranks in thirteenth
place, "far behind in wages, benefits, health care, pensions, paid vacation days
and educational opportunities."56 Meanwhile, the "real wages of American
production workers have declined by twenty percent since 1973, and the
standard of living for four out of five American families went down during
the 1980s."1 7 In terms of wealth, there has been "a massive shift" in the
last decade "from the poor and the working class to the rich."158 According
to a 1992 Federal Reserve study, the wealthiest 1% of the population now
owns 37% of the nation's wealth, while the bottom 90% owns only 31% of
the wealth. And a Business Week study found that "C.E.O.s in America now
152. JERRY T. JENNINGS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, VOTING AND REGISTRATION IN THE ELECTION
OF NOVEMBER 1992 55-56 (1993).
153. See discussion of Terry v. Adams infra part IV. The Jaybird Club is the private group whose
candidate nominating process was at issue in the Terry case.
154. Davis, 478 U.S. at 131. It is worth noting that even if the class of voters unable to participate
in the wealth primary is an actual majority of the public, it makes no constitutional difference. In Davis
v. Bandemer, the Court found that equal protection is violated when the electoral system substantially
disadvantages certain voters in their opportunity to influence the political process effectively. Id. at 130-32.
The Court emphasized that such unconstitutionality could consist of "continued frustration of the will of
a majority of the voters or effective denial to a minority of voters of a fair chance to influence the political
process." Plausible arguments could be made defining the outsider class here as either a majority or a
minority.
155. See supra note 13.
156. Sanders, supra note 17, at 865.
157. id.
158. Id.
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earn 157 times what a factory worker earns-the greatest gap in the industrial-
ized world."5 9 Of course, these disturbing trends are not necessarily-and
surely not exclusively-linked to the wealth primary system, but it is fair to
say that current wealth inequalities and the wealth primary exist in perfect
harmony.
There are two public interests in the wealth primary that might justify its
discriminatory character. First, such a system is arguably necessary to enable
candidates to raise sufficient funds to run for public office. Second, such a
system is arguably necessary to allow the public to determine which candidates
are serious about running for office and becoming public officials. Upon closer
inspection, however, these interests cannot rescue the campaign finance regime
because, if the spirit of Bullock is to be honored, they are not "reasonably
necessary to the accomplishment of legitimate state objectives. "160
The government undoubtedly has a legitimate objective in affording candi-
dates the opportunity to collect sufficient resources to run a serious race for
office. However, creating a process in which all candidates must rely on
personal wealth or the wealth of supporters to run is not necessary to accom-
plish this objective. There are readily available and arguably superior alterna-
tives, such as a mixed public-private financing system in which poor candidates
are given the resources necessary to run, or a wholly public system in which
all candidates are given campaign funding.' 6 '
Defenders of the wealth primary will, no doubt, protest that these alterna-
tives are not viable because they are too expensive. The truth is that we do not
know whether they would be more or less costly to the public than the wealth
primary. Surely the initial outlay by the government will be much greater in
a public financing scheme, but it is likely to be far less expensive to taxpayers
in the long run than a system which depends on wealthy private contributors,
who have a direct stake in legislative outcomes.62
Indeed, when we begin to tabulate the public costs of having a wealth
primary, even in an unscientific and unsystematic way, the conventional picture
changes rather rapidly. Congress regularly engages in irrational and wasteful
policies in order to benefit specific "cash constituents." The savings and loan
crisis is but one recent example of congressional favoritism towards cash
constituents over the interests of mere voters. In the most famous episode, five
U.S. Senators (of both parties) intervened on behalf of their campaign donor,
159. Id.
160. Bullock, 405 U.S. at 144.
161. See discussion infra part V.
162. The Working Group on Electoral Democracy estimates that the cost of its plan, which would
establish a system of total public financing for congressional elections, is $500 million or, on average, $5-
$10 per taxpayer. That represents a huge savings if we compare it to the cost of the savings and loan
bailout, which cost on average $3000 per taxpayer, not to mention the costs of other policies favoring the
cash constituents. For further discussion on public financing remedies, see infra part V.
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Charles Keating, in order to delay the shutdown and government takeover of
the failed Lincoln Savings and Loan, of which Keating was the principal
shareholder. That delay alone cost American taxpayers $1.3 billion, arguably
more than enough to finance a public campaign financing plan for a year.163
Despite the fact that savings and loan operators made billions in the 1980s,
Congress has left the clean-up bill for the S & L crisis with the American
taxpayer, at an average cost of $3000 per taxpayer.
In his powerful critique of the American campaign finance system, Still
the Best Congress Money Can Buy, Philip M. Stern carefully analyzed four
government measures favoring specific cash constituents at a total cost of $54
billion to consumers and taxpayers.'" Stern pointed out that even if one
attributes to the campaign finance system a mere ten percent of that cost, that
equals a $5 billion burden on the taxpayers as a result of the wealth primary
system. The real question may be not whether we can afford a public financing
system, but whether we can afford a strictly private one.
The second interest invoked on behalf of the wealth primary-to show the
public which candidates are serious about running for and holding public
office-was meticulously rejected in the filing fee cases as a rationale for
wealth barriers in politics. In Bullock and Lubin, the Court held that a state
may not define a candidate's "seriousness" with regard to her ability to raise
or spend substantial sums of money. Such a definition only rewards those
"serious" enough to be born wealthy and those "serious" enough to have
politics considered sympathetic by the wealthy. Meanwhile, those born poor
and those who have politics not supported by current economic elites are
deemed frivolous. Like the Texas filing fee system, the de facto "seriousness"
threshold of hundreds of thousands of dollars for House candidates and mil-
lions for Senate candidates weeds out not just frivolous contenders but serious
candidates who lack sufficient personal wealth and do not share political
positions of the dominant participants in the wealth primary. Campaign fund-
raising does not authentically "test the genuineness of a candidacy or the extent
of the voter support of an aspirant for public office. "165
B. Incumbent Self-Subsidies
The estimated $200,000 public subsidy to incumbents 166 arguably violates
both Article I and the Equal Protection Clause. Article I requires that the
163. PHILIP M. STERN, STILL THE BEST CONGRESS MONEY CAN BuY 177 (1992).
164. Id. at 165-78. The four government measures were the sugar subsidy (calculated at a $3 billion
cost), fuel efficiency standards (calculated at a $38 billion cost), the dairy subsidy (calculated at a $.55
billion cost to taxpayers and a $2.3 billion cost to consumers), and hospital cost containment (calculated
at a $10 billion cost)-for a total cost of $53.85 billion.
165. Lubin v. Parish, 415 U.S. 709, 717 (1974).
166. See supra part 11.B for background on this estimated figure for the incumbent subsidy.
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House of Representatives "shall be composed of Members chosen ... by the
people of the several States. "167 Article I, Section 3, as amended by the
Seventeenth Amendment, states that the Senate shall be composed of two
senators from each state "elected by the people thereof ... "168 In the same
way that the principle of popular election of members of the House is offended
when the government packs twice as many people into one congressional
district as another,'69 it is equally offended when the government essentially
creates quasi-official candidacies by conferring a powerful financial advantage
on the incumbent's campaign. This constitutional violation is especially egre-
gious since the party of incumbents in Congress is entrenching itself, and
exploiting public office and public money to curtail the democratic process.
This rigging of the political system is the very kind of failure of the political
process which the Constitution condemns."70
The $200,000 incumbent subsidy also arguably violates the equal protection
and First Amendment rights of nonincumbent candidates and their supporters.
In assessing this claim, we need to weigh the "character and magnitude of the
asserted injury" to their political rights caused by the incumbent subsidy
against the "precise interests put forward by the State as justifications" for it,
taking into account "the extent to which those interests make it necessary to
burden" political rights."'7 The magnitude of the injury caused by the subsidy
is great since it gives incumbents-who already possess greater name recogni-
tion, public visibility, and media access-a huge financial and organizational
headstart over challengers. The character of the injury is particularly discrimi-
natory as it generally deprives poorer candidates of the opportunity to wage,
and poorer voters the opportunity to support, a meaningful candidacy, since
they must raise $200,000 simply to reach the incumbents' starting line, at
which point the incumbents have long since pulled out of the gate. All of the
political, personal, and psychological benefits tied up with running for public
office are effectively denied to the poor, both as a class and as individuals. The
system operates to subsidize the speech and visibility of incumbents while
making it much more difficult for challengers even to get their campaigns off
167. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2 (emphasis added).
168. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 3.
169. See Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 8 (1964) ("To say that a vote is worth more in one district
than in another would not only run counter to our fundamental ideas of democratic government, it would
cast aside the principle of a House of Representatives elected 'by the People,' a principle tenaciously fought
for and established at the Constitutional Convention.").
170. As John Hart Ely argues, "unblocking stoppages in the democratic process is what judicial review
ought presumably to be about, and denial of the vote seems the quintessential stoppage." JoHN HART ELY,
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 117 (1980). Presumably, denial of a meaningful right to vote also comes within
Ely's theory. If he does not view the dilution of poor people's voting power by money as a systematic
process failure, then we have a difference in view.
171. Burdick v. Takushi, 112 S. Ct. 2059, 2063 (1992) (quoting Anderson v. Cellebrezze, 460 U.S.
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the ground.
The federal interests in the self-subsidy, if they can be teased out, must be
to allow contact with constituents and reduce the time members of Congress
spend fundraising. But even assuming these interests to be valid, they could
clearly be vindicated without so severely burdening the rights of challengers
and their supporters. Most obviously, an equal subsidy could be given to
challengers, and incumbents would still be able to stay in touch with constitu-
ents and still get their time release from fundraising.
Although the existing franking-privilege cases have not been well-conceived
by the various plaintiffs, they have in fact produced considerable judicial
language favorable to such an analysis. In 1972, the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit upheld a district court injunction ordering Congressman
Frank Annunzio to stop using his franking privilege to send mass mailings to
voters living outside his district who had been brought inside a newly drawn
district in which Annunzio would be a candidate during the next election.172
The court found that the franking privilege statute "cannot be construed to
favor one of two opposing candidates entitled to equal treatment under the
law."173 This case stands for the pure principle that, when it can be isolated,
the nakedly political use of the franking privilege must be invalidated.
In 1982, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia rejected a
frontal attack on the constitutionality of the franking privilege as an unlawful
subsidy to incumbent members of Congress. 174 However, the court worded
its decision in a way that clearly invites more carefully tailored challenges. The
court found that "the franking privilege confers a substantial advantage to
incumbent Congressional candidates over their challengers" but pointed out
that there was a "lack of evidence" presented as to how decisive such an
advantage was to incumbents' electoral success. 175 Moreover, the plaintiffs
had argued the overheated position that, as a remedy, the franking privilege
should be struck down entirely. As the court pointed out, they failed to argue
the far more compelling position that "non-incumbents should also be afforded
the franking privilege."" Given the existence of unobjectionable non-politi-
cal uses of the franking privilege, this clearly would have been a more promis-
ing form of relief to seek. In general, then, the court was dissatisfied with the
factual proof presented and remedial action requested. The court stated:
Were the frank to be shown to be available and widely used for reelection purposes and
had plaintiffs demonstrated that such use has a substantial detrimental impact on opposing
candidates or members of the voting public seeking to educate themselves on the
172. Hoellen v. Annunzio, 468 F.2d 522 (7th Cir. 1972).
173. Id. at 526 (citing Weisberg v. Powell, 417 F.2d 388 (7th Cir. 1969)).
174. Common Cause v. Bolger, 574 F. Supp. 672 (D.D.C. 1982).
175. Id. at 679.
176. Id. at 682.
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candidates and the issues, plaintiffs' claims, particularly those based on the First Amend-
ment, would have considerable merit. 77
C. Out-of-State Money
The constitutional principles of one person/one vote and election by "the
people" 17' are especially offended by the spending of campaign money in
House and Senate races raised out-of-state from persons who do not even have
the right to vote in the election. If it is debatable whether poor people in South
Carolina must tolerate the vote dilution caused by $1000 contributions given
by wealthy people in South Carolina, it seems much harder to defend the
legitimacy of $1000 contributions coming in from Florida, New York, or
Texas. These cash constituents from afar are affecting, in many cases decisive-
ly, who ends up representing the people of the district or state conducting the
election. This process tends to dilute the zealous independent representation
of the people of each state and to exacerbate the political neglect of the home-
state poor by making elected officials more accountable to the nationalized
interests of specific wealthy groups and industries. It also potentially expands
the political power of wealthier states, like New York and California, while
reducing the power of poorer states, perhaps even implicating Article V's
requirement that "no State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal
Suffrage in the Senate." 17' At any rate, as seen above, a number of senators
are very near the point of receiving one hundred percent of their money from
out-of-state. Can the nationalization of the wealth primary system in this way
really be compatible with the principles of one person/one vote and election
by "the people"?
IV.THE PRESENCE OF STATE ACTION AND
LEGISLATIVE INTENT IN THE WEALTH PRIMARY
We have deferred until now the problematic and related issues of "state
action" and legislative intent.18o State action is an inscrutable and historically
fluid concept still lacking any hard-and-fast doctrinal definition. Recently, the
Supreme Court has been squinting hard at claims of constitutional violation
177. Id. at 682.
178. See U.S. CoNsT. art. I; U.S. CONST. amend. XVII.
179. U.S. CONST. art. V.
180. State action refers here to state responsibility for denial of constitutional rights. This responsibility
is a key requirement for any claim under the U.S. Constitution. For an illuminating discussion of state
action, see Ira Nerken, A New Deal for the Protection of Fourteenth Amendment Rights Protection:
Challenging the Doctrinal Bases of the Civil Rights Cases and State Action Theory, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 297 (1977).
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when the state action ingredient is murky or novel.," While this chary atti-
tude might otherwise hinder the momentum of the "wealth primary" theory,
the Court has been careful not to abandon its sweeping "state action" holdings
in the specific field of elections and political process. In Flagg Brothers, Inc.
v. Brooks, the Court found that a warehouseman's proposed private sale of
goods that he was storing did not constitute state action simply because the sale
was authorized by state law." 2 But Justice Rehnquist, who authored the
Court's skeptical opinion, still took pains to defend the vitality of the so-called
"white primary" line of authority, although he did so in an unfortunately
narrow and grudging way. 8 3 At any rate, even according to Justice
Rehnquist, the extraordinary line of authority known as the white-primary
cases continues to exercise a strong pull on the constitutional imagination. This
sequence of holdings in the 1940s and 1950s dealt a critical blow to white
supremacy in politics and changed the way we think about the relationship
between the state and the electoral process. The jurisprudence of this period
provides both an important historical analogy and a conceptual framework for
understanding the sweeping changes which are necessary today.
In 1953, the Court went out on a limb to abolish the formal operation of
white supremacy in the electoral process. Earlier it had struck down all-white
Democratic Party primary elections in Texas that were authorized alternately
by statute, 84 by act of the state Party Executive Committee, 85 and by
resolution of the state party membership.' 86 Central to all of these early
decisions was the idea that the right to vote in a political party primary is
constitutionally protected, and the state cannot statutorily delegate to a political
party or its membership the effective right to discriminate on the basis of
race. 187
181. See, e.g., DeShaney v. Winnebago Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989) (ruling that there
was no state action where government social workers and other local officials failed to remove boy from
custody of father and boy was beaten and permanently injured); Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830
(1982) (finding that private school for difficult children not a state actor despite the fact that public funds
accounted for at least 90% of its budget); San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm.,
483 U.S. 522 (1987) (holding that U.S. Olympic Commission not a state actor simply because Congress
conferred upon it the right to bar certain other commercial and promotional uses of the word "Olympic").
182. Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978).
183. See id at 158 (stating that "our cases make it clear that the conduct of the elections themselves
is an exclusively public function," but also noting that the doctrine "does not reach all forms of private
political activity, but encompasses only state-regulated elections or elections conducted by organizations
which in practice produce 'the uncontested choice of public officials.'") (citing Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S.
461 (1953)).
184. Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927) (ruling that state statute barring African-Americans from
participation in Democratic primary violates Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
185. Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932) (holding that Executive Committee's action amounted to
a delegation of state power and was invalid under the Fourteenth Amendment).
186. Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944) (finding that exclusion of African-Americans from party
primary by vote of party membership constituted state action violating the Fifteenth Amendment).
187. Id. at 661-62, 664-65.
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But in Terry v. Adams, l"' the Court travelled an even greater distance
and essentially found state action where a state permits a wholly private but
race-exclusionary political organization to meet before a party primary. The
Court held that the Texas Jaybird Association, a large private political club
constituted of all white voters, could not exclude African-Americans from its
historically critical pre-primary endorsement process. 9 According to Justice
Black, who announced the Court's opinion, it was unlawful under the Fifteenth
Amendment for Texas to "permit such a duplication" of its election processes,
an offense simply compounded by the "use of the county-operated primary to
ratify the results of the prohibited election. "190 The state, according to Justice
Black, cannot permit a system to develop in which a private social group
excludes disfavored citizens on the basis of race from "an integral part" of
"the elective process that determines who shall rule and govern .... ."I
There were two other related but distinctive interpretations of the unlawful
state action in this case. Justice Clark found that "any 'part of the machinery
for choosing officials' becomes subject to the Constitution's restraints," even
if that machinery is a private association taking "the form of 'voluntary
association' of unofficial character."'92 Thus, the state action is not found
in the government's toleration or support of the system but in the fact of the
system itself. Justice Clark concluded that "when a state structures its electoral
apparatus in a form which devolves upon a political organization the uncontest-
ed choice of public officials, that organization itself, in whatever disguise,
takes on those attributes of government which draw the Constitution's safe-
guards into play."193
What Justice Frankfurter, in concurrence, identified as "the vital require-
ment" for identifying state action here was that "somewhere, somehow, to
some extent, there be an infusion of conduct by officials, panoplied with State
power, into any scheme by which colored citizens are denied voting rights
merely because they are colored. "194 Justice Frankfurter went on to describe
the Jaybird primary as "the instrument of those few . . . who are politically
active-the officials of the local Democratic Party and, we may assume, the
elected officials of the county."'95 The very officials who were supposed to
be protecting the voting rights of all citizens went through the elaborate
formality of voting, but in fact participated in "a wholly successful effort to
188. 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
189. Id. at 469.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 481.
193. Id. at 484.
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withdraw significance from" the official primary election.196
The teasing out of these separate theories makes the state action problem
less obdurate. Justice Black's definition of state action is helpful to our inquiry
because the government has certainly allowed a system to develop in which
wealthy private social groupings are permitted to exclude disfavored citizens-
at the very least the poor-from "an integral part" of "the elective process that
determines who shall rule and govern .
Second, if we take up Justice Clark's angle of vision, it is clear that the
wealth primary must face constitutional scrutiny because it has become "'part
of the machinery for choosing officials.'"' 98 This is apparent from the ex-
traordinary correlation between candidates who are wealth primary winners
and those who are general election winners. True, unlike the Jaybird primary
winner, the wealth primary winner is not always the general election victor,
but she is the winner the vast majority of the time. The integrity of our demo-
cratic process should not hinge on the slender difference between a discrimina-
tory process that determines election results one hundred percent of the time
and one which determines them eighty percent of the time. The critical impor-
tance of the wealth primary to election results should be enough to warrant
constitutional scrutiny even though the process of private fundraising assumes
"the form of 'voluntary association' of unofficial character."199 As Erwin
Chemerinsky has put it, "the concentration of wealth and power in private
hands... makes the effect of private actions in certain cases virtually indistin-
guishable from the impact of governmental conduct."200
Third, Justice Frankfurter's analysis may be the most amenable to the
wealth primary argument. Almost every elected public official in the federal
government is personally involved in the wealth primary as a recipient of both
public self-subsidies and private campaign funds. Indeed, elected officials
actively solicit these funds, accept them, record them, spend them and act, all
too often, in response to them. Members of the House and Senate also,
crucially, use private campaign contributions to deter potential opposition.
Thus, we find Justice Frankfurter's "vital requirement": "that somewhere,
somehow, to some extent, there be an infusion of conduct by officials, pano-
plied with state power .... 0' The elected officials who are supposed to
be protecting the undiluted integrity of all citizen votes are instead, on a year-
round basis, participating in a mostly successful "effort to withdraw signifi-
196. Id. at 474.
197. Id. at 469.
198. Id. at 481.
199. Id.
200. Erwin Chemerinsky, Rethinking State Action, 80 Nw. U. L. Rev. 503, 510-11 (1985) (arguing
for abolition of the state action requirement in constitutional law and collecting similar arguments offered
in the past).
201. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 473 (1953).
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cance from" the state-prescribed elections.2 2
It remains a question whether a showing of discriminatory legislative intent
would be required for an equal protection claim against the wealth primary.
In Davis v. Bandemer, the Court indeed held that plaintiffs making a political
gerrymandering claim under the Equal Protection Clause were required to
prove intentional discrimination.2 3 Yet, should we read this finding today
to mean that, if Texas claimed poverty and reimposed the same high candidate
filing fees struck down in Bullock, an indigent candidate challenging the fees
would have to show that the legislative intent behind them was to exclude the
poor from candidacy? Is a state electoral poll tax now constitutionally defensi-
ble if enacted for fiscal rather than political reasons? This would be a troubling
implication of Davis v. Bandemer, a case thought to expand the right of
meaningful political participation. After all, both the poll tax in Harper and
the high candidate filing fee in Bullock were defended, in part, precisely on
the grounds that they were justified by the state's nondiscriminatory interest
in raising revenue to cover the costs of running elections, an argument the
Court rejected in both cases. It is difficult to imagine that such an argument
could now triumph simply because of the somewhat unrelated holding in Davis
v. Bandemer that political gerrymandering plaintiffs must prove intentional
discrimination.
Even if the effects test from Bullock has been silently discarded, there are
processes in motion which would satisfy an intent requirement and further
bolster the conclusion that state action is present. In Davis v. Bandemer, the
Court was open to the idea that intent can be inferred from effects and that
legislatures should be presumed to know the political consequences of structur-
ing the electoral system in certain ways. 204 These concepts are obviously
useful since the effects of the wealth primary are so clear, above all to politi-
cians. However, there are even more active signals that a discriminatory
purpose is at work in the wealth primary.
The first one is the incumbent self-subsidy itself, by which Congress
chooses to finance its own members to some definite extent-we have put the
number at $200,000-in such a way as to promote the success of incumbent
reelection campaigns. This aspect of the system means not only that incum-
bents begin with a huge advantage but that, as favorites for reelection, they
can quickly mobilize private financial resources since wealthy donors and
202. Id. at 474; see also supra note 21.
203. 478 U.S. 109, 127 (1986) ("We also agree with the District Court that in order to succeed the
Bandemer plaintiffs were required to prove both intentional discrimination against an identifiable political
group and an actual discriminatory effect on that group") (citing Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 67-68
(1980) (holding that plaintiffs in minority vote dilution case must prove discriminatory intent in order to
achieve invalidation of multimember districting, and leading to 1982 amendments to the Voting Rights Act
of 1965)).
204. Id. at 127-28.
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PACs want to guarantee influence with those in power.2 5 Thus, government
officials intend to give themselves a subsidy which they also intend to deny
to challengers. This mechanism forces the challengers into the private market
for contributions, which is in turn slanted towards the interests of incumbents
by virtue of the second, but extremely subtle, form of discriminatory legislative
action.
This second discriminatory legislative intention appears in the pervasive
enactment by Congress of legislation which rewards and benefits specific
groups of cash contributors for their campaign support. 2" Special interest
legislation is a huge and deliberate state-sponsored return on the investment
of campaign contributions by special interests. This kind of state action is a
consequence of the wealth primary system because wealthy interests use their
money to acquire unjust advantage in the political process and obtain unequal
legislative results. But it is also a cause of the wealth primary system because
interested parties are forced to invest huge sums of money in the political
process in order to have their interests recognized. Of course, not all interested
parties-indeed, the majority of the population does not-have the money to
affect legislative outcomes. Thus, the closed circuit of large campaign contribu-
tions and large legislative payoffs systematically warps the democratic process,
drawing resources away from the nonaffluent.
It is inconceivable that members of Congress do not understand and, at the
very least, tolerate these exclusionary effects. Now, it is undeniable that in
1974 Congress, in the wake of the Watergate scandal, actually tried to reform
the campaign finance system but was rebuffed by the Court in Buckley. Yet,
the limitations imposed on campaign contributions and expenditures in the 1974
amendments to the Federal Election Campaign Act would at best have reduced
the vast power of the extremely rich such as Bebe Rebozo or Howard Hunt.
In fact, the $1000 limitation on individual contributions to federal campaigns
and the $5000 limitation on PAC contributions have done nothing to bring poor
people into the process of financing political campaigns. Since 1974, Congress
has done nothing to remove the structural impediments to political participation
by the nonaffluent despite the fact that members of Congress understand which
citizens participate in campaign financing and which do not. The failure to
legislate changes that would empower citizens of modest income in the cam-
paign finance process must reflect at the very least an intention to accept their
exclusion from this process.
Members of Congress presumably understand, from their own campaign
experiences, the ways in which political campaign money operates to under-
mine and choreograph the act of casting a ballot. They know the costs of
205. See supra note 18 and text accompanying supra notes 127-40.
206. See text accompanying supra notes 163-64.
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campaigns drive out most electoral competition at the stage at which potential
candidates are trying to decide whether or not to run. They know that big
money buys the media time needed to affect the public's perception of candi-
dates, as well as the political organization and staff needed to run a successful
campaign. One reason a well-heeled candidate will usually defeat a poorer
candidate is that the former can buy the things needed to win campaigns. They
know that big money buys influence with federal officials which either directly
or indirectly reduces the officials' willingness and time to address the needs
of less monied constituents. In short, when we look at the wealth primary as
a whole, we find a deliberate structuring of the political system in a way that
"will consistently degrade" the influence of nonaffluent citizens "on the
political process as a whole."207
V. THE QUESTION OF PLAINTIFFS AND REMEDIES
If the theory of this Article has merit, the following plaintiff classes would
have standing to assemble a state- or district-specific factual record and chal-
lenge the campaign finance system on equal protection grounds: (1) unsuccess-
ful challengers to congressional incumbents alleging that the in-kind incumbent
campaign subsidy gives incumbents an unfair advantage; (2) a group of
unsuccessful nonaffluent candidates who did not have personal wealth to give
to their own campaigns and could not raise sufficient money in the wealth
primary to become "financially serious" contenders; (3) working-class and
poor citizens who endorsed and voted for these nonaffluent candidates but
could not support them in wealth primaries because they could not afford to
give any money; (4) working-class and poor citizens economically excluded
from the wealth primary who wanted to contribute to winning candidates in
order to have ultimate equal access to them but could not; (5) working-class
and poor candidates who were deterred from running for office by the example
of other similarly situated candidates who were deemed financially frivolous;
(6) working-class and poor residents in a district alleging that the inclusion in
the wealth primary of wealthy citizens and PACs from outside of the districts
violates the constitutional principles of one person/one vote and election by
"the people"; and (7) minor political parties that allege that the combination
of the incumbent in-kind subsidy and the wealth primary make it impossible
for new political parties and ideas to compete meaningfully in the electoral
process.
If a court, federal or state, were to find that the current system of campaign
financing violates the Equal Protection Clause, what would the remedy be?
207. Davis, 478 U.S. at 132.
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There are three broad possibilities. First, the court could require the govern-
ment to provide a sufficient floor of public financing and media vouchers to
enable all serious challengers-those who have passed some reasonable thresh-
old determination of political seriousness, demonstrated perhaps by signatures
on petitions-to run viable campaigns. The level of money could be set either
in relation to the incumbent official's self-subsidy, which we have put at
$200,000, or the level of money spent by the victor in the last election.
However, under this plan, publicly financed challengers could still be outspent
by candidates raising private funds; that is, public money would set a floor for
indigent candidates or campaigns, but the sky would still be the limit in terms
of private money raised and spent. This remedy is thus similar in structure to
the Court's decision in Gideon v. Wainwright,25 which held that indigents
facing the criminal justice system have a right to a qualified and competent
lawyer-not a lawyer who is paid what the prosecutor is paid or what lawyers
for wealthy defendants are paid.
Second, the court could go a step further by setting a floor of public
financing for poor candidates but requiring the government to provide them
additional grants to match privately financed candidates who rise above that
floor in private contributions-in effect, establishing a system of complete
public financing for the indigent. Under this remedy, poor candidates would
have an escalator rather than just a floor, and wealthier interests and candidates
could not so easily reestablish the inequality of the old system. 2"
Third, the court could compel adoption of a system of total public financing
with mandatory expenditure limitations, thereby eliminating the need for the
government to provide additional grants to match the expenditures of privately
financed candidates. Under this remedy, those choosing to finance their
campaigns with private money could still do so, but would be prevented from
raising or spending more than the floor amount provided to publicly financed
candidates. In the alternative, the Court could rule that all private campaign
contributions are unconstitutional. This ruling would essentially declare election
campaigns to be a public thing, like the polling booth and the ballot box. On
this theory, any private money put into a campaign violates the principle of
one person/one vote by multiplying one person's views by the power of
wealth. As a practical matter, public funds could be distributed according to
some formula taking into account district population, square miles, and media
expense. Funds would go most easily to candidates' campaigns but, at least
as a theoretical matter, it makes equal sense to give each citizen a campaign
donation voucher for five or ten dollars and then let the campaigns compete
208. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
209. The Working Group on Electoral Democracy has proposed this kind of remedy and has drafted
legislation which would enact it. In their article in this issue, "A Proposal for Democratically Financed
Elections," Working Group members Marty Jezer, Randy Kehler, and Ben Senturia discuss this plan.
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for them.210
The elaboration of potential remedies makes clear that Congress would be
better positioned than the Supreme Court to develop a campaign financing
system predicated on political equality. It will be a complex administrative task
to work out the details of any of the public financing regimes described above.
Congress arguably has the power to create any of these systems even without
a judicial order to proceed to do so "with all deliberate speed."2 ' In Katzen-
bach v. Morgan,2 12 the Supreme Court found that Congress has the power
under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment to protect the equal protec-
tion rights of vulnerable minorities in the political process. This is true even
if the underlying inequality does not itself violate the Equal Protection Clause
found in Section One. Thus, whatever the merits of our claim that the current
system of campaign finance violates equal protection in the political process,
Congress undoubtedly has the power to promote equal protection in the
political sphere by enacting a system of publicly financed campaigns. Howev-
er, while a legislative solution is preferable to a judicial ruling because of
various administrative concerns, the fact that citizens would be asking congres-
sional incumbents to reform the system in which they thrive so as to empower
potential challengers, makes it unlikely that they will act with sufficient
dispatch or seriousness to avoid the necessity of seeking judicial relief.
VI. THE QUESTION OF REMEDIES AND BUCKLEY V. VALEO
As stated above, the equal protection challenge to our current system of
campaign finance is perfectly consistent with Buckley v. Valeo. If a court ruled
that the current system effectively excludes poor and working-class voters and
candidates and that, as a remedy, the government must establish a floor of
public financing for candidates, this would in no way impose limits on what
individuals could give to campaigns, spend on their campaigns, or spend
independently. In other words, bringing poor candidates up does not mean that
wealthy candidates would have to be brought down.
210. Professor Bruce Ackerman of Yale Law School recently proposed a voucher system. Bruce
Ackerman, Crediting the Voters: A New Beginning for Campaign Finance, AM. PROSPECT, Spring 1993,
at 71. Either version of this third remedy-total public financing with mandatory expenditure limitations
or complete elimination of private money from the electoral process replaced by a system of total public
financing or vouchers-would require a reversal of the Supreme Court's decision in Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1 (1976). For further discussion on this point, see infra part VI. But see Ackerman, supra, at 77-80
(arguing that voucher system proposal does not necessarily contradict Buckley ruling).
211. The phrase, "with all deliberate speed," comes from the Supreme Court's ruling in Brown v.
Board of Educ. I1, 349 U.S. 294 (1955), on the question of relief following its landmark decision in Brown
v. Board of Educ. 1, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). In Brown 11, the Court assigned the lower courts the responsibil-
ity of overseeing desegregation-"with all deliberate speed"-of the nation's public schools.
212. 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
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Consider again our analogy to legal representation. If a state had in 1960
tried to impose caps on what citizens could pay their lawyers, it is reasonably
clear that such an effort would have been struck down as an unconstitutional
interference with the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. But this holding would
have in no way restrained the Supreme Court from finding in Gideon v.
Wainwright that the government has a constitutional obligation to pay for
lawyers for indigent clients facing the criminal justice system.
The only remedy we have proposed that would require revisiting Buckley
is the third one: that the government establish a system of total public financing
with mandatory expenditure limitations or, in the alternative, that the govern-
ment-or the Court-prohibit all private money in the electoral process on the
grounds that it is unconstitutional under the one person/one vote principle. Yet,
even if we were to limit our discussion to the first two remedies, we would
likely still need to revisit Buckley. The antidemocratic assumptions of the 1976
decision are so ingrained in our thinking about private money in politics that
the case cannot be ignored. In the following section, then, we will review
Buckley and argue that a reconsideration of that ruling is long overdue.
A. The Buckley Decision
In 1974, the U.S. Congress passed a set of amendments to the Federal
Election Campaign Act (FECA) (first enacted in 1971) as its response to the
political abuses of the 1972 presidential campaign and the ensuing Watergate
scandal. 213 The amendments imposed limitations on contributions to a candi-
date for federal office and expenditures in support of such a candidacy. Under
the new FECA provisions, an individual could contribute no more than $1000
to a federal candidate in a primary or general election and political action
committees were limited to $5000 contributions per primary or general elec-
tion. The amendments also set limitations on overall campaign expenditures,
on expenditures by candidates from personal or family resources, and on
"independent" expenditures (expenditures made on behalf of a candidate but
not in coordination with the candidate's campaign). In addition, the amend-
ments created a scheme for the public financing system of presidential cam-
paigns, required reporting and disclosure of contributions and expenditures
above certain levels, and established the Federal Election Commission to
administer and enforce the federal campaign finance laws. Taken together, the
provisions constituted "by far the most comprehensive reform legislation [ever]
passed by Congress concerning the election of the President, Vice-President,
and members of Congress. "214
213. Wright, supra note 23, at 1003.
214. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 7 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821, 831 (D.C. Cir. 1975)).
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Soon after its passage, an unlikely coalition of plaintiffs (including then-
Senator James Buckley (R-NY), presidential candidate Eugene McCarthy,
philanthropist Stewart Mott, the Conservative Party of the State of New York,
the Mississippi Republican Party, the Libertarian Party, and the New York
Civil Liberties Union) filed suit in federal court challenging the new FECA
provisions as unconstitutional on First and Fifth Amendment grounds. With
respect to the provisions limiting campaign contributions and expenditures, the
plaintiffs argued that "limiting the use of money for political purposes consti-
tute[d] a restriction on communication violative of the First Amendment, since
virtually all meaningful political communications in the modern setting involve
the expenditure of money. "215
In an opinion written by Judge J. Skelly Wright, the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit upheld, with one exception, the substantive
new provisions of FECA.216 In analyzing the First Amendment issues pre-
sented in the case, the court held that the FECA provisions regulating cam-
paign contributions and expenditures were regulations of conduct not speech
and that, therefore, the Supreme Court's ruling in United States v. O'Brien
217
should apply.2"' The court found that the FECA provisions passed the four-
part test set out in O'Brien. It held that the Government had "a clear and
compelling interest in safeguarding the integrity of elections and avoiding the
undue influence of wealth.'219 The court noted that
It would be strange indeed if, by extrapolation outward from the basic rights of individu-
als, the wealthy few could claim a constitutional guarantee to a stronger political voice
than the unwealthy many because they are able to give and spend more money, and
because the amounts they give and spend cannot be limited.'2
The Supreme Court refused to follow the D.C. Court of Appeals' applica-
tion of the O'Brien test to the new FECA provisions. "[T]his Court has never
215. Id. at 11. The plaintiffs also challenged other provisions of FECA, such as the reporting and
disclosure requirements, the provision establishing the Federal Election Commission, and the provision
creating a public financing system for presidential campaigns. We will only address the issues raised by
their challenge to the contribution and expenditure limitations, as those directly relate to the current election
financing system for congressional elections.
216. Buckley, 519 F.2d 821 (D.C. Cir. 1975). The district court transmitted the case to the court of
appeals without a ruling.
217. 391 U.S. 367 (1968). The O'Brien case involved a defendant who claimed that prosecution for
burning his draft card violated his First Amendment rights since his act was "symbolic speech" engaged
in as a "demonstration against the war and against the draft." Id. at 376. The Court found in O'Brien that
the federal statute prohibiting the knowing destruction of a draft card was a regulation of conduct, not
speech. It held that such a regulation is sufficiently justified if it meets the following four conditions: (1)
"it is within the constitutional power of the Government"; (2) "it furthers an important or substantial
governmental interest"; (3) "the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression";
and (4) "the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to
the furtherance of that interest." Id. at 377.
218. Buckley, 519 F.2d at 840.
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suggested," it wrote, "that the dependence of a communication on the expendi-
ture of money operates itself to introduce a nonspeech element or to reduce
the exacting scrutiny required by the First Amendment."22 t The Court also
refused to accept the argument by some of the appellees that the FECA
provisions amounted to reasonable time, place, and manner regulations.2
22
"The critical difference between this case and those time, place, and manner
cases," the Court stated, "is that the present Act's contribution and expenditure
limitations impose direct quantity restrictions on political communication and
association by persons, groups, candidates, and political parties in addition to
any reasonable time, place, and manner regulations otherwise imposed."'
The Court framed the contribution and expenditure limitations as operating
"in an area of the most fundamental First Amendment activities."
224
Discussion of public issues and debate on the qualifications of candidates are integral to
the operation of the system of government established by our Constitution. The First
Amendment affords the broadest protection to such political expression in order "to
assure [the] unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social
changes desired by the people."
By "treating the regulation of campaign monies as tantamount to the regulation
of political expression, [t]he Court told us, in effect, that money is
speech."226 These findings allowed the Court to apply the strict scrutiny
standard to the new FECA provisions. Under that standard, "a "significant
interference' with protected rights of political association' may be sustained
if the State demonstrates a sufficiently important interest and employs means
closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgement of associational free-
doms. "227
221. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 16. The Court further held that "lelven if the categorization of the
expenditure of money as conduct were accepted, the limitations challenged here would not meet the O'Brien
test because the governmental interests advanced in support of the Act involve 'suppressing communica-
tion.'" Id. at 17.
222. The Court has found such regulations to be constitutional when they do not discriminate among
speakers or ideas and when they "further an important governmental interest unrelated to the restriction
of communication." Id. at 18 (citing Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 209 (1975)).
223. Id. at 18.
224. Id. at 14.
225. Id. (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)).
226. Wright, supra note 23 at 1005.
227. Buckley, 421 U.S. at 25 (citations omitted). It is possible to argue that, as stated, this standard
is a lower standard than strict scrutiny which is commonly understood as requiring a "compelling state
interest" and means which are "narrowly drawn" to meet that interest. Though the Buckley decision is not
a model of clarity in judicial decisionmaking, the context of this statement supports the notion that the Court
was applying strict scrutiny to the FECA provisions. First, by finding that the contribution and expenditure
limitations operated "in an area of the most fundamental First Amendment activities," id. at 14, the Court,
in effect, equated campaign contributions and expenditures with pure speech. Regulations of pure speech
are subject to strict scrutiny. Second, the Court found that the limitations constituted restrictions on the
First Amendment right of association, and quoted NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460-461 (1958)
for the proposition that "[i]n view of the fundamental nature of the right to associate, governmental action
which may have the effect of curtailing the freedom to associate is subject to the closest scrutiny."
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The appellees argued the FECA provisions regulating campaign contribu-
tions and campaign expenditures served three important governmental interests:
(1) "the interest in curbing the corrupting influence of large contributions on
candidates and elected officials and eliminating the appearance of such influ-
ence" ;221 (2) the interest in "equaliz[ing] the ability of all citizens to partici-
pate in elections and affect the choices available in them" ;229 and (3) the
interest in opening the electoral process to candidates less able to meet the
prohibitive costs of election campaigns-"to increase both the number and the
diversity of voices heard in politics by removing access to wealth as a qualifi-
cation for office. "23' The appellees argued that the interests served by the
FECA limitations were "the most compelling interests in a representative
democracy. "231
In reviewing the contribution and expenditure limitations, the Court applied
the strict scrutiny test to each restriction on a separate basis. In each case the
Court weighed the governmental interests against the apparent infringement
of First Amendment rights. The Court found the prevention of corruption and
the appearance of corruption to be a sufficiently weighty governmental interest
justifying limitations on individual and PAC contributions to a candidate and,
therefore, found it unnecessary to weigh the other governmental interests cited
by the appellees. The Court, however, held that the restrictions on campaign
expenditures (overall campaign expenditure ceilings, limitation on expenditures
by a candidate from personal or family resources, and limitation on indepen-
dent expenditures) imposed a "markedly greater burden" on First Amendment
rights than did the campaign contribution restrictions.232 The Court wrote:
A restriction on the amount of money a person or group can spend on political communi-
cation during a campaign necessarily reduces the quantity of expression by restricting
the number of issues discussed, the depth of their exploration, and the size of the
audience reached. This is because virtually every means of communicating ideas in
today's mass society requires the expenditure of money.233
The Court found that none of the governmental interests cited were suffi-
cient to justify the restrictions on campaign expenditures. With specific regard
to the ceiling on overall campaign expenditures, the Court held that "[t]he
major evil associated with rapidly increasing campaign expenditures is the
danger of candidate dependence on large contributions." That danger, the
Court stated, is addressed by the limitations on contributions. The Court found
the interest in equalizing the financial resources of candidates to be "no more
228. Brief for Appellees at 75, Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1975) (Nos. 75-436, 75-437).
229. Id. at 81.
230. Id. at 86-87.
231. Id. at 75.
232. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44.
233. Id. at 19.
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convincing a justification. ... "
Given the limitation on the size of outside contributions, the financial resources available
to a candidate's campaign, like the number of volunteers recruited, will normally vary
with the size and intensity of the candidate's support. There is nothing invidious,
improper, or unhealthy in permitting such funds to be spent to carry the candidate's
message to the electorate. 5
The Court similarly struck down the new FECA provision limiting expendi-
tures by candidates from personal or family resources. Placing emphasis,
again, on the governmental interest of preventing actual and apparent corrup-
tion, the Court found that this interest did not justify such a limitation. In fact,
the Court argued, "the use of personal funds reduces the candidate's depen-
dence on outside contributions and thereby counteracts the coercive pressures
and attendant risks of abuse to which the Act's contribution limitations are
directed."" In reviewing this restriction, the Court also weighed the ancil-
lary interest in equalizing the financial ability of candidates to compete in
elections and found that interest was similarly insufficient to justify the limita-
tion. The Court argued that the limitation might not promote such financial
equality since "[a] candidate who spends less of his personal resources on his
campaign may nonetheless outspend his rival as a result of more successful
fundraising efforts."" The Court further argued that "more fundamentally,
the First Amendment simply cannot tolerate [the] restriction upon the freedom
of a candidate to speak without legislative limit on behalf of his own candida-
cy. ,,238
In discussing the campaign expenditure limitations, the Court spent the bulk
of its time addressing the limitation on "independent" expenditures. The Court
wrote that:
[t]he absence of prearrangement and coordination of an expenditure with the candidate
or his agent not only undermines the value of the expenditure to the candidate, but also
alleviates the danger that expenditures will be given as a quid pro quo for improper
commitments from the candidate.
2 39
To the Court, then, the governmental interest in preventing actual and apparent
corruption was not sufficient to justify such a limitation. With regard to this
limitation, the Court also looked at the "ancillary governmental interest in
equalizing the relative ability of individuals and groups to influence the out-
234. Id. at 56.
235. Id. (citations omitted).
236. Id. at 53 (citation omitted).
237. Id. at 54.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 47.
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come of elections"2" and found that interest to be insufficient as well. In
what is perhaps the most controversial and dubious statement in the Buckley
opinion, the Court stated that the concept that government may restrict the
speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice
of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment, which was designed "to
secure 'the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and
antagonistic sources,'" and "'to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the
bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people.'" 4 '
In a footnote, the Court stated that the voting rights cases "serve to assure
that citizens are accorded an equal right to vote for their representatives
regardless of factors of wealth or geography. "242 It refused, however, to
extend this principle to "justify governmentally imposed restrictions on political
expression. "243
B. Revisiting Buckley v. Valeo
To the Court in Buckley, money in politics was a free speech issue that
implicated the First Amendment rights of those giving and spending money
in elections. However, as we have shown, private money in politics makes
wealth a determinant factor in our elections, violating the equal protection
rights of poor and working-class candidates and voters. Like the high candidate
filing fee and the poll tax of the past, our system of privately financed elections
serves as a new barrier to the franchise. When viewed in this context, Buckley
does not hold up.
Buckley is challengeable on several fronts. Our approach here is not to
reiterate all the arguments as to how the Court erred, but rather to review
Buckley in the context of Bullock v. Carter and other equal protection voting
rights cases. Analyzed this way, Buckley upholds the political deployment of
wealth as a barrier to effective exercise of the right to vote.
The very premise of Buckley, that money equals speech, is quite dubi-
ous.2' If money equaled speech, we should have a constitutional right to
bribe elected officials; laws against bribery would violate our rights to express
240. Id. at 48.
241. Id. at 48-49 (citations omitted).
242. Id. at 49, n.55.
243. Id.
244. This continues to be a subject of much dispute. Many have argued that the act of contributing
and spending money in elections is conduct related to speech but that "money, itself, is not speech." Wright,
supra note 23, at 1019. As Judge J. Skelly Wright wrote in a critique of the Court's opinion in Buckley:
"[l]deas, and not intensities, form the heart of the expression which the First Amendment is designed to
protect. Money may register intensities, in one limited sense of the word, but money by itself communicates
no ideas." Id. (citation omitted). Whether the act of giving and spending money in elections constitutes
conduct related to speech or speech itself is critical to the question of which test-the O'Brien test or the
strict scrutiny test- the Court should have applied to the FECA limitations and, therefore, is critical to
the question of the constitutionality of the limitations.
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our political opinions. Yet, speech is defined in such a way as to exclude the
personal corruption of elected officials. Why, then, should it not be defined
in such a way as to exclude the systematic corruption of the political process
by private wealth?
Accepting, arguendo, the Court's premise in Buckley that money equals
speech, this kind of speech should not be protected absolutely. "To enforce
freedom of speech in disregard of the rights of others would be harsh and
arbitrary in itself."245 The Buckley Court erred in not addressing the issue
of what other rights are implicated by the private financing of elections, other
than the First Amendment rights of those who give and spend money on
political campaigns. By not properly weighing the First and Fifth Amendment
rights of the voters, the Court, in effect, placed the First Amendment rights
of some above the rights of others.2"
The Court has long held that the government may impose reasonable
regulations on the manner of speech and that the First Amendment does not
include a right to drown out the speech of others. In the 1949 case, Kovacs
v. Cooper,247 the Court reviewed a Trenton, New Jersey ordinance regulating
the use of soundtrucks on public streets. Accepting the New Jersey Supreme
Court's interpretation of the statute as applying "only to vehicles with sound
amplifiers emitting loud and raucous noises,"248 the Court held that the ordi-
nance was a reasonable regulation of the manner of speech. "Unrestrained use
throughout a municipality of all sound amplifying devices would be intolera-
ble," the Court wrote.249
Central to the Court's finding in Kovacs was its view that public streets
were designed for use by the public and ought not to be obstructed by any
specific individuals or groups of individuals. "Opportunity to gain the public's
ears by objectionably amplified sound on the streets is no more assured by the
245. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 88 (1949).
246. The First Amendment is of particular importance to the electoral process. As the Court stated
in Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 223 (1989) (holding that
California election laws which prohibited political party endorsements of candidates in party primaries and
which regulated the internal affairs of parties were invalid infringements on the free speech and freedom
of association rights of parties and their members) (quoting Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265,
272 (1971)), "the First Amendment 'has its fullest and most urgent application' to speech uttered during
a campaign for political office." But see Burdick v. Takushi, 112 S. Ct. 2059 (1992) (upholding Hawaii's
ban on write-in voting). In Burdick, the Court refused to find that the write-in ban implicated the plaintiff
voter's First Amendment rights. While the Court did not accept an explicit link between the right to vote
and the First Amendment, the Court only addressed the write-in voting question and did not speak more
broadly about the First Amendment in the overall electoral process. If, as the Court stated in Eu, the First
Amendment is especially crucial for speech during a political campaign, then it ought to protect not only
the free speech rights of the well-financed candidates but the free speech rights of all candidates and, by
extension, the rights of their supporters.
The Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause, which applies to the states, is applicable to the
federal government through the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
247. 336 U.S. 77 (1949).
248. Id. at 85.
249. Id. at 81.
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right of free speech than is the unlimited opportunity to address gatherings on
the streets."' The Kovacs Court cited an earlier decision for the point that
"'[m]unicipal authorities, as trustees for the public, have the duty to keep their
communities' streets open and available for movement of people and property,
the primary purpose to which the streets are dedicated.'"" The government,
then, may lawfully regulate certain conduct on the public streets. For example,
a person seeking to distribute literature on the streets could not exercise this
liberty by taking her stand in the middle of a crowded street, contrary to traffic
regulations, and maintaining her position to the stoppage of all traffic; a group
of distributors could not insist upon a constitutional right to form a cordon
across the street and to allow no pedestrian to pass who did not accept a
tendered leaflet; nor does the guarantee of freedom of speech or of the press
deprive a municipality of power to enact regulations against throwing literature
disseminated in the streets.252
This point has direct relevance to the regulations at issue in Buckley. In
the political arena, money serves as a means of amplifying speech. With the
new FECA provisions, Congress sought to regulate that amplifying system so
that other voices could also be heard. Like our public streets, our public
elections-designed for the people to choose their representatives-ought not
to be obstructed by any special interests, including those who seek to amplify
their speech through the expenditure of large sums of money. Just as "[u]nres-
trained use . . . of all sound amplifying devices [is] intolerable"253 through-
out a municipality, so too is it intolerable in our elections.254
The Buckley Court, however, refused to apply the Kovacs holding to the
contribution and expenditure limitations. Instead, it sought to create an irratio-
nal distinction between manner of speech and quantity of speech. "The decibel
restriction upheld in Kovacs," the Court stated, "limited the manner of operat-
ing a soundtruck, but not the extent of its proper use. 255 Yet, one's manner
of speech necessarily involves how loudly one speaks. A person who is
whispering is speaking in a different way, using a different manner of speech,
than one who is shouting. As Judge Wright says, "the distinction simply does
not bear up under analysis."
256
250. Id. at 87-88.
251. Id. at 88, n.13 (quoting Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 160-61 (1939)).
252. Id.
253. Id. at 81.
254. As the late constitutional scholar Paul Freund wrote:
The right to speak is, I submit, more central to the values envisaged by the First Amendment
than the right to spend. We are dealing here not so much with the right of personal expression
or even association, but with dollars and decibels. And just as the volume of sound may be
limited by law, so the volume of dollars may be limited, without violating the First Amendment.
Paul A. Freund, Commentary in ALBERT J. ROSENTHAL, FEDERAL REGULATION OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE:
SOME CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS 71, 72 (Citizens' Research Foundation ed., Study No. 18, 1972).
255. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 18-19, n.17.
256. Wright, supra note 23, at 1011, n.41.
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In Kovacs, for example, the soundtruck operator was surely faced with a quantity
restriction. Operating at an unrestricted decibel level, he might have been able to reach
all the citizens of his target area by, say, driving down every third street. Operating
within the ordinance at a lower volume might have required driving down every street.
The quantity of his speech, if one chooses to view it in that fashion, has been reduced
by two-thirds." 7
The time, manner, and place cases can be seen as quantity restrictions and the
Buckley Court's attempt to make this distinction remains, today, unpersua-
sive. 25
The Kovacs Court recognized that the right of an individual to be free to
speak is not absolute and must be balanced against the rights of others:
City streets are recognized as a normal place for the exchange of ideas by speech or
paper. But this does not mean the freedom is beyond all control. We think it is a
permissible exercise of legislative discretion to bar sound trucks with broadcasts of public
interest, amplified to a loud and raucous volume, from the public ways of municipali-
ties. 259
As Justice Jackson wrote in his concurrence, "[fireedom of speech for Kovacs
does not, in my view, include freedom to use sound amplifiers to drown out
the natural speech of others."260
The Buckley Court wrote that "virtually every means of communicating
ideas in today's mass society requires the expenditure of money. "26 But
what does this mean for those who do not have the money to spend to amplify
their voices? If, in fact, the expenditure of money is the principal "means of
communicating ideas in today's mass society, "262 then how can those who
do not have the necessary money participate in the "unfettered interchange of
ideas, "263 and how can the citizenry receive "the widest possible dissemina-
tion of information from diverse and antagonistic sources? "264 There is an
inherent contradiction in claiming, on the one hand, that candidates have a
First Amendment right to spend an unlimited amount of money in their cam-
paigns and, on the other hand, that this same First Amendment is designed to
257. Id.
258. Even with its own distinction between the "manner" and "extent" of speech, the Court's decision
not to apply the Kovacs precedent was in error. With limitations on overall campaign spending, candidates,
for example, might not be able to purchase as much television time for their commercials. But this does
not mean that candidates operating under such expenditure limitations are barred from amplifying their
speech in other ways. The limitation on overall campaign expenditures then, like the ordinance in Kovacs,
affected the way-or manner-candidates could amplify their speech, rather than affecting the extent of
their speech.
259. Kovacs, 336 U.S. at 87.
260. Id. at 97.
261. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 19.
262. Id.
263. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 483 (1957).
264. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 19 (1945).
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protect the "unfettered interchange of ideas."265 By allowing other voices
to be heard, the contribution and expenditure limitations at issue in Buckley,
in fact, enhanced the very purpose of the First Amendment. In striking down
the limitations in the name of the First Amendment, the Court engaged in legal
fiction.
The Buckley Court asserted that "the concept that the government may
restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the
relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment .... 266
But the concept which "is wholly foreign to the First Amendment" is that
which says that the First Amendment includes the right to drown out the voices
of others.2 67 The Court's statement completely contradicts Kovacs and other
cases involving time, place, and manner restrictions. As law professor Ray
Forrester argues,
[t]his sweeping pronouncement is about as sound as a declaration that the First Amend-
ment protects the use of bullhorns by those able to afford them to drown out other
speakers in political debate. When justified, the law does equalize voices so all can hear
the several messages without undue interference or advantage. That is the sounder, freer
view of the First Amendment.
26
1
265. Roth, 354 U.S. at 483.
266. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 48-49.
267. See Cass R. Sunstein, Is Free Speech the Enemy of Democracy?, BOSTON REV., Mar./Apr. 1993,
at 12 (arguing that just as the nation had an economic New Deal in the 1930s involving democratic
experimentation with the economy, "[wie now need a New Deal for speech, one that would extend some
of the ideas of the economic New Deal to the political arena. A New Deal for speech would require a new
understanding of freedom of expression ... [one which] would be more self-consciously focused on our
constitutional aspirations to democracy."). According to Sunstein, the Buckley Court's position that
"reliance on markets is government neutrality" is misguided because it "strikingly reflects pre-New Deal
understandings." Id. at 15. Sunstein points out that "jellections based on existing distributions are actually
subject to a regulatory system, made possible and constituted through law. That law consists not only of
legal rules protecting the present distribution of wealth, but more fundamentally, of legal rules allowing
candidates to buy speech through markets." Id. at 15. Therefore, just as the economic New Dealers rightly
redefined "the economic status quo [as] a product of legal rules and political decisions and not simply free,
individual market choices," id. at 12, we can redefine speech to serve "the democratic aspirations that
underlie the First Amendment itself." Id. at 15. With this new definition, "[eifforts to redress economic
inequalities, or to ensure that they do not translate into political inequalities, [would] not be seen as
impermissible redistribution, or as the introduction of government regulation where it did not exist before,"
but rather would be evaluated "pragmatically in terms of their consequences for the system of free
expression." Id. See also CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION (1993).
268. Ray Forrester, The New Constitutional Right to Buy Elections, 69 A.B.A. J. 1078, 1080 (1983).
Although not as effective as full public financing, limitations on overall campaign spending alone may
prevent other voices from being drowned out. If the Buckley Court had upheld the FECA limitations on
overall spending, the cost of a campaign today for the House of Representatives could not exceed $152,000.
Given that the average cost of a winning House campaign today is $543,000 and that many House
candidates spent more than $1 million last year, that limitation would certainly have made it easier for those
with less campaign money to be heard. Some voices, however, would still be drowned out. These voices
will be heard only through total public financing, in which all qualified candidates receive the same amount
of money so that they can each devote the same amount of resources to broadcasting their messages.
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C. Revisiting Buckley on the Facts Alone
Even if one does not agree that the Buckley Court neglected the rights of
the voters and of candidates less able to gain the financial support of wealthy
interests, the Court's reasoning deserves reconsideration based on the facts
alone. In a context similar to election financing, the Court has already indicat-
ed that it will review facts which show that wealth has an undue influence on
the political process. Two years after Buckley, the Supreme Court decided First
Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,269 a case involving the constitutionality of
a Massachusetts statute prohibiting corporations from making contributions or
expenditures to influence the outcome of ballot initiatives which did not
materially affect the property, business, or assets of the corporation. Though
the Court struck down the statute on First Amendment grounds, it left the door
open for another case which could demonstrate corporate influence over the
initiative process. The Court stated:
According to appellee, corporations are wealthy and powerful and their views may drown
out other points of view. If appellee's arguments were supported by record or legislative
findings that corporate advocacy threatened imminently to undermine democratic
processes, thereby denigrating rather than serving First Amendment interests, these
arguments would merit our consideration. But there has been no showing that the relative
voice of corporations has been overwhelming or even significant in influencing referenda
in Massachusetts or that there has been any threat to the confidence of the citizenry in
government.
270
More recently, the Court has further recognized the harmful effects of
concentrated wealth on the political process. In Austin v. Michigan Chamber
of Commerce,271 the Court upheld a Michigan criminal statute preventing
corporations from spending general funds as independent expenditures in state
elections. The Court found that Michigan had a compelling interest in combat-
ting a "different type of corruption in the political arena: the corrosive and
distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with
the help of the corporate form and that have little or no correlation to the
public's support for the corporation's political ideas. "272 As Stephen Loffredo
writes, the Austin Court "squarely acknowledged-for the first time in constitu-
tional discourse-that inequalities of private economic power tend to reproduce
themselves in the political sphere and displace legitimate democratic gover-
nance. "
273
With Austin as the new backdrop, we can return to the Court's signal in
269. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
270. Id. at 789-90 (citation omitted).
271. 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
272. Id. at 660.
273. Loffredo, supra note 10, at 1285.
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Bellotti and show that today the power of unrestrained concentrated wealth
"threaten[s] imminently to undermine democratic processes."274 Indeed, the
facts since Buckley and Bellotti have substantially changed. In the seventeen
years since the Court's ruling in Buckley, this country has seen the cost of
elections spiral out of control. In the 1992 elections, more than $678 million
was spent on campaigns,275 an almost 700% increase from a decade ago.276
Today, the average cost of a winning campaign for the U.S. House of Repre-
sentatives is $543 ,000.277 If the Court had upheld the limitation on overall
campaign expenditures, the cost of such a campaign last year would have been
limited to $152,000 (after adjustment for the rise in the consumer price
index).27 On the Senate side, the limitation would have varied according to
the state, but the costs of such campaigns would have been dramatically
different than they are today. In 1990, Senator Jesse Helms spent $17.7
million-the most money spent to date on a Senate race-to defeat his opponent
Harvey Gantt and retain his seat from North Carolina. If the Court had upheld
the limitation on overall campaign expenditures, Helms and Gantt would each
have been limited to spending no more than $990,039.279
The Buckley Court found that the FECA limitations on contributions
sufficiently addressed the governmental interest in preventing corruption and
the appearance of corruption and that the limitations on overall campaign
expenditures would not serve that purpose. The dramatic rise in the cost of a
winning House or Senate campaign, however, has placed enormous pressure
on candidates to raise large sums of money in order to remain competitive.
This means, in turn, that those who seek influence through this system of
unlimited spending will often contribute money in ways which undercut the
anticorruption purpose of the contribution limitations.
For example, many corporations attempting to strengthen further their
influence in the electoral process will bundle individual contributions in order
to evade the $10,000 limitation on PAC contributions for one election cy-
cle.28 ° Those individuals contributing $200 or more accounted for over $129
million in contributions to winning House and Senate candidates in the 1992
274. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 789.
275. Federal Election Commission, Press Release, 1992 Congressional Election Spending Jumps 52 %
to $678 Million 1 (Mar. 4, 1993) (on file with Center for Responsive Politics).
276. HERBERT E. ALEXANDER & BRIAN A. HAGGERTY, FINANCING THE 1984 ELECTION 90 (1987)
(citing $88.2 million as the total for congressional campaign expenditures in the 1983-84 election cycle).
277. Forty-six House candidates each spent more than $1 million on their campaigns in 1992,
compared with 11 in 1990. PRICE OF ADMISSION, supra note 121, at 41.
278. Center for Responsive Politics, Calculation based on formula proposed in the 1974 amendments
to the Federal Election Campaign Act (unpublished analysis, on file with the Center for Responsive
Politics).
279. Id.
280. MAKINSON, supra note 18, at 28-29. Political action committees may contribute only $5000 per
election. With primary elections, this means that the total PAC contribution limitation for a primary and
general election cycle combined is $10,000.
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elections.28" ' An analysis of that money shows that many of the same indus-
tries and interest groups that dominate in PAC giving also give heavily through
individual contributions.282 Despite the limitation on PAC contributions,
eighteen senators received contributions of $20,000 or more from a single
company or interest group in the 1990 elections.283 Senator Bill Bradley of
New Jersey received more bundled contributions than any other Senate candi-
date in 1990, drawing $20,000 or more from nine securities firms, five law
firms and three film studios. The Wall Street brokerage firm, Shearson Leh-
man Hutton, alone gave a total of $71,800 in bundled contributions to the
Bradley campaign. On the House side, the story was no different. Some forty-
six House members collected contributions of $15,000 or more from a single
source in 1990.2"4 Republican House member Dave Camp of Michigan re-
ceived the biggest bundle of cash of any candidate in that election. Camp
received over $100,000 from the Dow Chemical Company's PACs, its employ-
ees and officials, and their families. Dow Chemical's headquarters are in his
hometown of Midland, Michigan.2"5
The rising costs of winning campaigns and the subsequent pressure on
candidates to keep up with the money chase has also exacerbated the problem
of soft money.2" 6 Soft money contributions are contributions made to the
political parties, ostensibly for "party building" activities. In reality, the soft
money loophole allows the parties and their financial backers to circumvent
federal law and to make contributions that would be illegal if made directly
to campaigns. In the 1992 election cycle, the two major political parties raised
a total of $83.4 million in soft money (Republican Party-$48.9 million;
Democratic Party-$34.5 million).2"7 Of this total amount, $37.8 million (or
forty-five percent) was raised in contributions of $100,000 or more.288 The
overwhelming majority of soft money contributions were concentrated among
big business interests seeking to gain further influence in Washington. In 1992,
the financial, insurance, and real estate industries made soft money contribu-
tions of $10.9 million to the Republican Party and $6.2 million to the Demo-
cratic Party.28 9 The communications and electronics industries gave more
than $3.3 million to the Republicans and more than $4 million to the Demo-
281. Center for Responsive Politics, Analysis of Federal Election Commission Records (unpublished
analysis, on file with the Center for Responsive Politics).
282. MAKINSON, supra note 18, at 26.
283. Id. at 28.
284. Id. at 29.
285. Id.
286. In addition to upholding the $1000 limitation on individual contributions per election and the
$5000 limitation on PAC contributions, the Buckley Court also upheld the $25,000 limitation on the annual
maximum in contributions per individual to all candidates, PACs, and national parties. 424 U.S. at 143.
Through soft money, campaign contributors evade all of these limitations.
287. JOSH GOLDSTEIN, SOFr MONEY, REAL DOLLARS: SoFr MONEY IN THE 1992 ELECTIONS (1993).
288. Id. at 2, 4.
289. Id.
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These kinds of contributions, raised amidst the fury of unlimited campaign
spending, illustrate the need for contribution limitations. Those who make such
contributions expect something in return. What they get is the ability to
exercise undue influence over the public policy decisions of our elected
officials. They can thwart legislative initiatives and make compromise difficult,
help determine which bills and amendments are introduced and not introduced,
and affect the substance of legislation once it is presented for consideration.
In short, they get something in return for their money. That is corruption.
The contribution limitations, alone, have proven insufficient. Faced with
these facts today, the Court would need to revisit its finding in Buckley that
limitations on overall campaign spending would not help prevent corruption
and the appearance of corruption. The Court would also need to weigh again
other governmental interests for limiting overall spending, including the
interest in equalizing all citizen voices in the electoral process and the interest
in opening the electoral process to candidates less able to meet the prohibitive
costs of election campaigns.
In addition, the Court would need to weigh the equal protection rights of
candidates who lack personal wealth and who are unable to gain the financial
support of wealthy interests, the equal protection rights of voters who support
such candidates, and the equal protection rights of voters who have less
opportunity to participate in the political process because of their inability to
contribute large sums of money to electoral campaigns. While public financing
of elections would help protect such rights, such a remedy, standing alone,
may not be effective. In weighing the government's need to protect these
rights, the Court would need to consider how mandatory expenditure limita-
tions strengthen the public financing remedy and ensure that wealth is elimi-
nated as a determinant factor in our elections. 29'
The facts since 1976 have also substantially changed with regard to the use
of a candidate's personal wealth in campaigns. The 1992 elections saw the
Ross Perot phenomenon, a phenomenon directly tied to the Court's decision
in Buckley to strike down the limitation on expenditures by a candidate from
personal and family resources. Ross Perot was only the latest in a series of
candidates since Buckley who have sought to buy their viability in elections
290. Id. at 6.
291. In addition, such limitations can also be justified today by the need to reduce the time members
of Congress spend raising money. Senators must now raise an average of $12,000 each week in order to
remain competitive in the next election. Members of both the House and Senate are constantly concerned
about raising money for their campaign coffers in a system in which the money chase never ends. This
only takes time away from their responsibilities to serve their constituents. If the Court were to revisit
Buckley today, it would need to assess fully the manner in which unlimited campaign spending has affected
the time members of Congress devote to the governing process.
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with their own wealth.292 In 1988, Herb Kohl used $7 million of his own
money as a Democratic candidate for the Senate from Wisconsin to win that
Senate seat.2 93 In 1992, California Republican Michael Huffington spent
more than $5.1 million of his own money-more than seven times what his
opponent could spend-and won a House seat.294 The Perot candidacy, how-
ever, exemplified more than any other campaign the error in the Court's
finding that the limitation on a candidate's use of her own resources was not
justified by the governmental interests at stake. While Perot's grassroots
support should not be underestimated, a candidate's ability to spend $60
million of his own money to try to buy the presidency does undermine "the
integrity of our system of representative democracy."295
The facts with regard to independent expenditures today also show that the
Court erred in Buckley in striking down limitations in that area. Independent
expenditures reached their highest point yet in 1988, with some $20.8 million
spent during that year's campaigns (up from $2 million in 1976). Much of that
total came from the National Security PAC, which ran an $8.5 million cam-
paign with the "Willie Horton" ads attacking Democratic presidential nominee
Michael Dukakis. In 1984, a California real estate developer spent more than
$1.1 million in independent expenditures to defeat U.S. Senator Charles Percy
(R-Ill.), allegedly because of Percy's voting record on issues related to Israel
which had angered the pro-Israel lobby.2 96 And in 1990, the National Associ-
ation of Realtors spent more than $1 million in independent expenditures to
support four Senate candidates and five House candidates.297 All four Senate
candidates and three of the five House candidates won election.
These independent expenditures continue to serve as a vehicle for circum-
venting the limitation on direct contributions to a candidate. The Buckley Court
found that "[t]he absence of prearrangement and coordination" of independent
expenditures with the candidate or her campaign alleviated the danger that such
expenditures would corrupt the electoral and legislative process. 298 Yet, it
is often impossible to distinguish between expenditures that have been coordi-
nated in some way with a candidate's campaign and those which are truly
"independent." The distinction the Buckley Court sought to draw between
campaign contributions and independent expenditures becomes even more
tenuous in the face of present-day facts. As Justice White wrote in his Buckley
292. Ross Perot ran as an independent candidate for President in 1992, spending more than $60 million
of his own money and garnering 19% of the popular vote. Anthony Lewis, Abroad at Home; the New
Landscape, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 1992, at A29.
293. Center for Responsive Politics, National Library on Money & Politics (unpublished analysis,
on file with the Center for Responsive Politics).
294. Id.
295. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26-7.
296. ALEXANDER & HAGGERTY, supra note 276, at 46.
297. MAKINSON, supra note 18, at 15.
298. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 47.
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dissent:
It would make little sense to me, and apparently made none to Congress, to limit the
amounts an individual may give to a candidate or spend with his approval but fail to limit
the amounts that could be spent on his behalf. Yet the Court permits the former while
striking down the latter limitation.' 9
What made little sense to Justice White in Buckley continues to make little
sense today.
VII. CONCLUSION
Our political regime has become consistently more democratic over time.
New groups have won the franchise, dismantling false social and political
boundaries. Old schemes aimed at diluting the vote-like poll taxes, literacy
tests, grandfather clauses, and malapportioned districts-have been aboli-
shed. 3" Today our problem is private money dominance in the political
process, a system in which the huge costs of campaigns act as de facto filing
fees that put political office way beyond the financial reach of the majority of
people. The vast amounts of money raised in a quasi-formalized process
further function to separate the majority of people from the decisionmaking
aspects of the "wealth primary." Although the "small donor" is at the center
of the ideology supporting this system, she is a fiction in terms of how most
money is raised. Thus, as big costs deter nonaffluent candidates and big money
dominates both the selection of candidates and the policies of government, a
kind of diffuse poll tax is imposed, weakening the value of the votes of
ordinary people.
Far from being compelled by the Constitution, this is a process fundamen-
tally destructive of the one person/one vote principle. While one can only hope
that Congress and state legislatures will act to reverse the dynamics of money
politics, experience suggests that the political power of wealth guarantees a
vicious cycle in legislative bodies. That explains the importance of elaborating
a constitutional theory for the courts.
299. Id. at 261.
300. But see Shaw v. Reno, 61 U.S.L.W. 4818, 4822-24 (U.S. June 28, 1993) (holding that a state's
electoral redistricting plan which is "so bizarre" that it "rationally cannot be understood as anything other
than an effort to separate voters into different districts on the basis of race [without] sufficient justification"
is subject to strict scrutiny, thereby allowing white plaintiffs in North Carolina to challenge a plan which
created two African-American majority congressional districts and which resulted in the first African-
American Members of Congress from North Carolina since Reconstruction). This case suggests that at least
some portion of the Court has designs on overturning the whole system of majority-minority congressional
districts on equal protection grounds. Such a move would turn back the clock in a nation that, until the
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Of course, it is no secret that the current Supreme Court is unlikely right
now to make the several logical leaps in the areas of state action and intent
which are required to identify and strike down the wealth primary. But what
if, instead of a frontal attack on the wealth primary, the people undertook a
carefully staged progression of equal protection suits challenging specific
inequities under the current regime? We can envision challenges to the franking
privilege, the spending of private money in judicial elections, the spending of
out-of-state money in congressional districts, the injustice of corporate lawyers
and executives being able to run for office and receive salaries from their firms
while working-class candidates are unable to run for office because they cannot
afford to quit their jobs and campaign, and so on. We can also envision a
series of state cases challenging the campaign finance system based on state
constitutional grounds, much like the recent state cases on public school
financing in which state supreme courts have interpreted their state constitu-
tions more broadly than the Supreme Court's interpretation of the U.S. Consti-
tution in Rodriguez.30 1 Such suits could quickly destabilize the traditional
assumption that wealth is a permissible and necessary actor in the political
process. They could also mobilize public and judicial perception to recognize
the equal protection imperative of public campaign financing. Such a campaign
could look to the litigation strategies worked out in the past by Charles Hamil-
ton Houston and Thurgood Marshall and later Ruth Bader Ginsburg to system-
atically push the Court to reinterpret equal protection and invalidate racial and
gender discrimination." 2 For the abolition of the systemic inequities caused
by wealth in the political process would mark nothing more, nor less, than
further progress toward realizing the constitutional promise of democracy in
America.
301. See Denise C. Morgan, What is Left to Argue in Desegregation Law?: The Right to Minimally
Adequate Education, 8 HARV. BLACKLETTER J. 99, 112-14 (1991) (discussing the "fight for equal
education," including cases brought on state constitutional grounds).
302. See RANDALL W. BLAND, PRIVATE PRESSURE ON PUBLIC LAW: THE LEGAL CAREER OF JUSTICE
THURGOOD MARSHALL: 1934-1991 (1973); RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN
V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY (1976); GENNA RAE MCNEIL,
GROUNDWORK: CHARLES HAMILTON HOUSTON AND THE STRUGGLE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS (1983); DONALD
G. NIEMAN, PROMISES TO KEEP 137 (1991) (discussing Houston and Marshall's legal strategy of using
cases challenging unequal pay for African-American teachers and discrimination in graduate and profession-
al schools to establish "the first crack in the South's wall of segregation"); Jeffrey Rosen, The Book of
Ruth, NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 2, 1993, at 19 (discussing now-Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg's sustained and
systematic attack on gender discrimination and her long-term plan to bring the Supreme Court around to
the view that Equal Protection requires a heightened scrutiny of gender-based statutory discrimination).
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POSTSCRIPT
On November 22, 1993, just prior to its winter recess, the U.S. House of
Representatives passed a campaign finance reform bill which would provide
partial public funding to House candidates who agree to comply with voluntary
limits on overall campaign expenditures. The vote came some five months after
the U.S. Senate approved its own version of campaign finance reform, a bill
which would impose a new tax on candidates who refuse to comply with
voluntary spending limits and a ban on political action committee contributions.
Both houses of Congress must now try, in a conference sometime in 1994, to
reconcile the differences between the two bills. Even if a joint bill emerges
from that conference and is approved, the House must still enact separate
financing legislation before its partial public funding plan becomes law.
"This bill is real reform." So declared Congresswoman Rosa DeLauro of
Connecticut upon passage of the House bill.3o3 But neither the House bill nor
its counterpart in the Senate come close to eliminating the worst inegalitarian
features of the wealth primary or to securing the guarantee of equal protection
in the political process. Rather than providing even the bare minimum of a
floor of public financing, the House bill will only provide public funds as a
match to private dollars a candidate is able to raise on her own (matching the
first $200 of any contribution). Thus, public money will be used not to open
up an exclusionary process but to reinforce and to amplify the voice of those
already wealthy enough to give. Further, the bill will provide public funds only
up to a third of the overall spending limit, which in some contested races could
go as high as $970,000 by 1996."° The Senate bill is even more disappoint-
ing, providing public funds to candidates-up to one-third of the voluntary
spending limit-only if their opponents go above such limits, which range from
$2 million to $8.25 million.3 5
The House and Senate bills are tiny improvements that will only lock into
place a fundamentally flawed regime in which private wealth continues to
dominate electoral process and outcomes. It is increasingly clear that we cannot
depend on the U.S. Congress, whose members are chief beneficiaries of the
wealth primary system, to lead the way to a campaign finance regime predicat-
ed on real political equality. The current bills only underscore the need for
judicial intervention.
303. See Beth Donovan, House Takes First Big Step In Overhauling System, 51 CONG. Q. WKLY.
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